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At the same time that Canadian public law jurisprudence has grappled with some key 
cases on bias, a vibrant debate has also raged over the meaning and scope of the notion 
of impartiality within political and moral philosophy. Spurred by Rawls’ view of liberalism, 
and culminating in the theory of deliberative democracy, this debate evolved over a span 
of more than four decades. Yet this philosophical literature is rarely, if at all, referred to in 
the public law jurisprudence dealing with impartiality. This article asks whether the debates 
surrounding impartiality in political and moral philosophy and those in Canadian public law 
share common ground and explores the ways in which these discourses might speak to one 
another. The author argues that knowledge of the two debates challenges us to reconsider 
the judicial methods by which decision-making impartiality is established. This is particularly 
so in administrative law. The author proposes a theory of grounded impartiality in Canadian 
administrative law, which requires courts and administrative actors to pay close attention 
to factors such as administrative actor provenance, shared and local understandings, and 
the possibility for genuine discourse. While certain political and moral philosophers have 
advocated for similar factors as ideal means for assessing an individual’s claim to the 
good life, a parallel approach has faced ambivalent reception in Canadian administrative 
law impartiality jurisprudence. Nevertheless, this article argues that a theory of grounded 
impartiality would allow for better-informed, more meaningful, and transparent decision 
making with respect to allegations of bias.  
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Alors que la jurisprudence du droit public canadien était aux prises avec certaines causes 
majeures sur le parti pris, un vif débat faisait rage sur le sens et la portée de la notion 
d’impartialité dans le cadre de la philosophie politique et morale. Alimenté par l’opinion de 
Rawls sur le libéralisme et culminant avec la théorie de la démocratie délibérative, ce débat 
a évolué depuis plus de quatre décennies. Il est pourtant rarement – sinon jamais – fait 
référence à ces documents philosophiques dans la jurisprudence du droit public traitant de 
l’impartialité. Cet article soulève la question à savoir si les débats sur l’impartialité dans le 
domaine de la philosophie politique et morale et ceux sur le droit public canadien ont un 
terrain commun et s’ils explorent les façons dont ces discours pourraient communiquer. 
L’auteur fait valoir que la connaissance de ces deux débats nous met au défi de réexaminer 
les méthodes judiciaires permettant la prise de décisions impartiales. Cela s’applique 
tout particulièrement au droit administratif. L’auteur propose une théorie d’impartialité 
fondamentale en droit administratif canadien, exigeant que les tribunaux et les intervenants 
administratifs se penchent sur des facteurs tels la provenance de l’intervenant adminis-
tratif, des ententes partagées et locales et la possibilité d’un discours authentique. Bien que 
certains philosophes politiques et moraux préconisent de tels facteurs comme excellents 
moyens d’évaluer la revendication d’une bonne qualité de vie de la part d’un particulier, 
une approche parallèle a reçu un accueil mitigé en jurisprudence de l’impartialité en droit 
administratif canadien. Quoi qu’il en soit, cet article soutient qu’une théorie d’impartialité 
fondamentale permettrait de prendre des décisions mieux informées, plus significatives et 
transparentes en ce qui a trait aux allégations de parti pris.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IMPARTIALITY IS OFTEN TREATED as an insular concept in Canadian public law 
jurisprudence.1 The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC or the Court) cases dealing 
with the disqualification of public decision makers for reasonable apprehension 
of bias have centred on common law concerns about whether certain conditions 
said to guarantee impartiality have been satisfied. Interestingly, at the same time 
that Canadian public law has grappled with some key cases on bias, a vibrant 
debate has also raged over the meaning and scope of the notion of impartiality 
within political and moral philosophy. Spurred by John Rawls’s view of liberalism 
and culminating in the theory of deliberative democracy, this debate evolved 
over a span of more than four decades, starting in the 1970s. Yet, public law 
jurisprudence dealing with impartiality rarely, if at all, refers to this philosophical 
literature.
Political and moral philosophy is the branch of philosophy that sets “the 
tradition of political thinking on a foundation of moral argument.”2 It maintains 
that political deliberation in a democracy can and should start from the moral 
judgments of ordinary citizens, and concerns itself with the ways that these 
judgments can attain a common public good without bias towards the special 
interests of any individual or group. The ideals of political and moral philosophy 
have gained purchase in contemporary discussions over public policy and social 
justice. This article goes beyond those spheres to inquire into the ways in which 
the debates surrounding impartiality in moral and political philosophy and those 
in Canadian public law share common ground. More specifically, this article 
asks how political and moral philosophy may prove useful in understanding and 
furthering the Canadian administrative law jurisprudence on impartiality. In this 
article, I argue that comparing the philosophical and jurisprudential discourses 
challenges us to reconsider the judicial methods by which decision-making 
impartiality is established, and that this challenge is particularly pertinent in 
administrative law. 
In this article, I develop a theory of grounded impartiality to be used in 
Canadian administrative law. Grounded impartiality refers to the use of inquiry 
and close inspection during judicial review in order to ensure impartiality on 
the part of decision makers and their institutions. The theory relies on a set of 
1. This article refers to constitutional and administrative law. The intricacies of criminal law, tax 
law, and other specialized autonomous public law areas are not addressed.
2. See Martha Nussbaum, “The Enduring Significance of John Rawls”, Chronicle of Higher 
Education (20 July 2001) B7 at B9. Although the branch of philosophy is termed “political 
and moral philosophy,” this article at times uses the shorthand of “political philosophy.”
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generative conceptual factors drawn from the impartiality debates in political 
and moral philosophy that can serve to guide judicial inquiry into whether a 
reasonable apprehension of bias exists in any given set of circumstances. An 
approach to impartiality that reflects concerns emphasized in political and moral 
philosophy can already be seen in public law cases in which the bias of individual 
judges is alleged. However, a similar approach has yet to crystallize fully in 
administrative law. 
In Part II of this article, I provide an overview of the major debates regarding 
impartiality that have arisen in political and moral philosophy. John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice3 is chosen as a starting point4 because his work conveys contem-
porary originating ideas of how the State should maintain impartiality among the 
many moral doctrines that may arise in public decision making, public-policy 
making, and, more generally, in the creation of public institutions. Rawls’s work 
also provides a procedure (albeit one that is strongly contested) for determining 
what is socially just amidst competing conceptions of the good. I then briefly 
examine some of the major responses to Rawls’s theory from communitarian, 
contextualist, feminist, and discourse theorists. 
Part III of the article begins by outlining the main analytical approaches 
to ascertaining impartiality in judicial and administrative decision making in 
Canadian public law jurisprudence. It then draws on the philosophical foundation 
set out in Part II to show that the use of the conceptual factors of grounded 
impartiality can lead to decisions about impartiality that are better-informed, 
more meaningful, and more transparent. Ultimately, I conclude that examining 
issues of administrative law impartiality through this philosophical lens can serve 
to inspire greater public confidence in our public institutions.
3. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1971). 
Rawls initially revised his work in preparation for German translation in 1975, though the 
final body of revisions incorporated changes made in response to criticisms and a revised 
second edition was published in English in 1999. The revisions touched on the substance of 
some of Rawls’s ideas including the formulation of the two principles of justice as fairness. 
(Rawls’s first principle of justice as fairness was reworked several times, including in 1973 
and 1993, to adjust the meaning of “extensive basic liberty”.) This article refers to the 1971 
edition of the text. I have chosen the earlier edition because many of the major schools of 
thought that replied to or critiqued Rawls’s theory did so before 1999 and their responses are 
therefore to the original version of this work.
4. Although this article starts with the contemporary work of John Rawls, this is not to 
discount the important role that earlier philosophers such as Immanuel Kant also played in 
asserting a necessary connection between the moral judgment of ordinary citizens and good 
political deliberation. The work of these earlier philosophers, however, is beyond the scope of 
this article.
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II. IMPARTIALITY IN POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: 
FROM RAWLS TO HABERMAS
A. RAWLS AND IMPARTIALITY
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice deals with the political question of how to 
maintain State impartiality among a plurality of moral doctrines when designing 
the public institutions responsible for distributing social goods. The concern was 
prompted by the deep inequalities in social position that are brought about by 
birth and socio-economic circumstances and that are unmeritoriously favoured 
by the political system. These inequalities may lead to the creation and distri-
bution of rights, duties, and advantages that similarly reflect unequal social 
participation. Rawls therefore outlined a set of principles for identifying the 
considerations relevant to determining the proper balance between competing 
claims of “the good life.”5 
Although created as a hypothetical construct not necessarily designed 
to be put in action, the procedure outlined in A Theory of Justice provides an 
avenue through which citizens can determine substantive principles of justice 
impartially. In Rawls’s procedure, citizens abstract themselves from their moral 
commitments, obligations, community ties, and worldviews in order to agree on 
the first principles of justice. Moreover, each person “exclud[es] the knowledge 
of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided 
by their prejudices,”6 including age, race, gender, and degree of wealth. In this 
hypothetical situation, the parties are said to be in the “original position” and 
under a “veil of ignorance.” The process of choosing principles of justice under 
these conditions, said Rawls, was one of rational justification—meaning that 
after reflecting on feasible alternatives, the individuals should select the principles 
they wish to govern the distribution of social goods for all.7 According to Rawls, 
individuals who have distanced themselves from their immutable personal 
characteristics and socio-economic circumstances are the ones who should decide 
the distribution of social goods. Theoretically, this citizen participation would 
give rise to an egalitarian or impartial assignment of rights, duties, and benefits 
and receive citizen approval on that basis.
5. Rawls, supra note 3 at 9-10.
6. Ibid at 19.
7. See ibid at ss 20-21 (for the list of alternative conceptions of justice from which those in the 
original position are to choose).
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Rawls asserts, however, that two substantive principles of justice will always 
naturally guide those in the original position. These principles are: first, that 
each person should equally possess the greatest liberty that is compatible with 
similar liberty for others (the liberty principle); and second, that inequalities in 
the distribution of advantages be allowed only if they work to the benefit of the 
worst-off members of society (the difference principle).8
B. THE SUBJECT OF RAWLSIAN JUSTICE AND DECISION-MAKING 
INSTITUTIONS
Rawls’s theory is generally known for its application to public-policy making, 
but to what extent can it address adjudicative decision-making institutions such 
as courts and tribunals? In this section, I discuss the scope of Rawls’s concept of 
justice, highlighting aspects of Rawls’s theory that shed light on his understanding 
of impartiality in legal decision-making contexts. 
Rawls begins his theory with an express indication of the scope of its 
application, explaining what constitutes the subject of justice. For Rawls, the 
subject of justice is the basic structure of society. It concerns “the way in which the 
major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine 
the division of advantages from social cooperation.”9 The “major social institu-
tions” are ones that play the fundamental role of defining an individual’s “rights 
and duties” and “influence their life-prospects, what they can expect to be and 
how well they can hope to do.”10 Rawls’s ideal is meant to be pervasive. It is clear 
that the institutions he contemplated not only encompass traditional political 
institutions but economic institutions, competitive markets, private property, 
and the family as well.11
8. Ibid at ss 11, 60-61.
9. Ibid at 7. Another useful formulation of the subject of justice is given later in section 14: 
“[T]he first distributive problem is the assignment of fundamental rights and duties and the 
regulation of social and economic inequalities and of the legitimate expectations founded on 
these” (ibid at 84).
10. Ibid at 7. 
11. Ibid. In Rawls’s words: 
Our topic … is that of social justice. For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of 
society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental 
rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. By major 
institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal economic and social 
arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, 
competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous 
family are examples of major social institutions.
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Rawls’s delineation of the subject of justice invites questions about the extent 
to which courts and other public decision-making bodies would be similarly 
encompassed. Rawls’s theory is addressed primarily at societal decision making in 
a broad sense: It aims to provide a way for members of society to reach agreement 
on principles of justice without favouring a particular conception of the good in 
the process. It is clear that Rawls’s project is relevant to public debate leading to 
the creation of laws. Less clear is the degree to which it would address competing 
conceptions of justice that become manifest during the application and judicial 
review of these laws. In other words, more emphasis is placed on impartiality in 
defining the elements of institutional design leading to the creation of just laws 
than on the impartial application and review of such laws.12 
Rawls refers to common public decision-making institutions (courts, 
tribunals, and other entities of public administration), though they are not 
the central focus of his work.13 Nevertheless, courts and other adjudicative 
bodies implicitly fall within the tapestry of “social institutions [that] distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from 
social cooperation.”14 Indeed, there are two significant instances where judging 
and impartiality are discussed in A Theory of Justice—with respect to the rule of law 
and the impartial sympathetic observer. The next section outlines Rawls’s view on 
judging as seen through his commentary on these two ideas. This discussion will 
serve as a useful background against which to consider how critiques of Rawlsian 
 See also Shane O’Neill, Impartiality in Context: Grounding Justice in a Pluralist World 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997) at 13. O’Neill asserts that the main 
elements of the basic structure of society include aspects of life that earlier liberals would have 
considered beyond the scope of public concern such as economic institutions—including the 
competitive market and private property—and social institutions such as the family.
12. See Andreas Schedler, “Arguing and Observing: Internal and External Critiques of Judicial 
Impartiality” (2004) 12:3 J Pol Phil 245 at 248. Schedler explains the distinction between 
the two types of impartiality in this way: 
Impartial institutions are ethically neutral insofar as they do not discriminate between 
competing conceptions of the good. Impartiality as a principle of argumentation and decision-
making is epistemically neutral insofar as it gives a fair hearing to all points of view involved 
in a conflict.
13. See Ibid. Schedler observes that the implications of Rawls’s work for adjudicative impartiality 
have not been given much attention. Impartiality as a function of designing institutions 
is treated at length in Rawls’s work and its exegesis. However, impartiality as a normative 
principle of action is not prominent. Schedler states that the idea of “justice as impartiality” 
has been concerned with impartial institutions, rather than impartial actors.
14. Rawls, supra note 3 at 7.
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liberalism may be aligned with the need for a more expansive and concrete 
understanding of impartiality in administrative decision-making contexts.
C. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE IMPARTIAL SYMPATHETIC OBSERVER
Rawls defines the rule of law as the consistent application of public rules within 
the legal system. This idea of justice as regularity was described in A Theory of 
Justice as “formal justice.”15 It stems from Rawls’s view that an institution is a 
public system of directives in which everyone subject to the system and adminis-
tering it is aware of the rules. Rawls points out that treating like cases in a similar 
manner by applying “the correct rule as identified by the institutions”16 does 
not necessarily ensure that substantive justice will result. The degree to which 
regular application will render justice in a substantive sense depends, first, on 
the principles of substantive justice on which the laws and institution rest and, 
second, on the possibility of reforming these principles. For Rawls, the useful 
aspect of formal justice, and the reason why it should be preserved, is simply 
that it secures legitimate expectations. People subject to a regularized system 
will know what to expect and will govern themselves accordingly, even if the 
substantive principles on which the law is built are unfair.17
However, the rule of law entails not only consistency but also impartiality in 
the application of the law. Rawls states explicitly that judges must be “independent 
and impartial” in order to preserve the rule of law.18 In this sense, the authorities 
administering the law should not be influenced by “personal, monetary or other 
15. Ibid at 58.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid at ss 14, 83-87. Rawls’s description of formal justice also brings to mind his discussion of 
pure, perfect, and imperfect procedural justice. These comments are made in expounding on 
the second part of the second principle of justice—fair equality of opportunity. Rawls asserts 
that the role of the principle of fair opportunity is to ensure that the system of cooperation is 
one of pure procedural justice. In brief, pure procedural justice means simply that following 
a procedure deemed to be fair produces a necessarily fair result. In explaining this concept, 
Rawls contrasts it with perfect and imperfect procedural justice. Perfect procedural justice, 
which is rare, exists where there is an independent standard for deciding which outcome is 
just as well as a procedure guaranteed to lead to it. Imperfect procedural justice exists when 
there is an independent criterion for the correct outcome but no feasible procedure sure 
to lead to it. Criminal trials are given as an example of imperfect procedural justice. Colin 
Kaufman summarizes Rawls’s ideas on the different forms of procedural justice in one of 
the earlier works to address the concerns raised by communitarians, feminist theorists, and 
others. See Colin K Kaufman, “The Nature of Justice: John Rawls and Pure Procedural 
Justice” (1979-1980) 19:2 Washburn LJ 197.
18. Rawls, supra note 3 at 239.
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irrelevant considerations in their handling of particular cases.”19 Violations of 
the rule of law can occur as a result of bribery, corruption, and the abuse of the 
legal system to punish political enemies, as well as through subtler means like 
bias against certain groups.20 Rawls’s comments on formal justice and the rule 
of law focus on independent conditions that verify, by their presence or absence, 
whether an official’s decision making has been prejudicially influenced. But, with 
respect to a process for deciding matters between two or more competing claims, 
the notion of impartiality is elaborated more fully in Rawls’s criticism of the 
utilitarian notion of the impartial sympathetic observer.
The impartial sympathetic observer theory maintains that the most effective 
way to come to a decision about what is just is for a rational spectator to place him 
or herself in the position of each person affected. Rawls describes the impartial 
sympathetic observer in the following way:
[H]e is equally responsive and sympathetic to the desires and satisfactions of every-
one affected by the social system. His own interests do not thwart his natural sym-
pathy for the aspirations of others and he has perfect knowledge of these endeavors 
and what they mean for those who have them. Responding to the interests of each 
person in the same way, an impartial spectator gives free reign to his capacity for 
sympathetic identification by viewing each person’s situation as it affects that per-
son. Thus he imagines himself in the place of each person in turn, and when he has 
done this for everyone, the strength of his approval is determined by the balance of 
satisfactions to which he has sympathetically responded.21 
Thus, the approach taken by the impartial sympathetic observer is character-
ized by an ability to identify with each claimant’s situation and with his or her 
understanding of what is good. Rawls denounced this approach, however, for 
bringing sympathy into the standard of justice. Using sympathy as determinative, 
Rawls argued, is akin to adopting a view of the good and imposing it on others.22 
Instead, he favoured an approach based on mutual disinterest. In keeping with 
his central liberal idea that those making decisions about the good of society 
must be disembodied, Rawls argued that these actors best exercise their discretion 
19. Ibid at 59.
20. Ibid at 235.
21. Ibid at 186.
22. It is ironic that Rawls prefers the approach of mutual disinterest because it “leads to the 
two principles of justice” (ibid at 187). It is interesting that he does not elaborate why these 
liberalist principles should be seen as any less partial than the guiding principle of sympathy.
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by viewing the possibilities in a general way. As Seyla Benhabib has put it, for 
Rawls, the process of moral decision making: 
involves the capacity to take the standpoint of the other, to put oneself imaginatively 
in the place of the other, but under the conditions of the ‘veil of ignorance,’ … the 
other is not constituted through projection, but as a consequence of total abstrac-
tion from his or her identity.23  
In conclusion, Rawls addresses impartiality and judging by painting a 
picture in which decision-making fairness is encased in objective guarantees. This 
universalist approach uses the criteria of distance and objectivity to determine if 
fairness can be achieved. The use of abstraction and distance as means of guaran-
teeing impartiality in decision making is, in many ways, a fundamental ideal of 
classic liberalism. Most notably, it pervades the work of Ronald Dworkin, who, 
as a counterpart to Rawls in the realm of jurisprudence, also espoused the liberal 
notion of a neutral, disinterested, and objective judge who could balance his 
or her own political morality against the requirements of jurisprudential fit.24 
In other words, the idea that impartiality requires objectivity, abstraction, and 
disinterest resonates with liberalism as a political ideology and finds support in 
both political and legal theory.
Nevertheless, engaging with the more subjective, “messier” aspects of legal 
and factual analysis may, in some cases, provide more authentic and fair results.25 
23. Seyla Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan 
Controversy and Feminist Theory” in Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell, eds, Feminism as 
Critique: On the Politics of Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 77 at 
89 [Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other”].
24. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986) [Dworkin, Law’s 
Empire]. The notional judge referred to as “Hercules” is discussed in Taking Rights Seriously 
(London: Duckworth, 1978). See also Anne Barron, “Ronald Dworkin and the Challenge of 
Postmodernism” in Alan Hunt, ed, Reading Dworkin Critically (New York: Berg, 1992) 141. 
Barron carefully and usefully delineates Dworkin’s connection to liberalism. See also generally 
Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011).
25. Canadian equality jurisprudence has shown as much with its doctrinal shift from formal to 
substantive equality. For an illustration of this shift, see Bliss v Canada (AG), [1979] 1 SCR 
183, 92 DLR (3d) 417 [Bliss]; Brooks v Canada Safeway Ltd, [1989] 1 SCR 1219, 59 DLR 
(4th) 321 [Brooks]. In Bliss, the SCC held that a benefit plan that was disadvantageous to 
women on maternity leave did not discriminate on the basis of gender. The Court went on 
to state that “[a]ny inequality between the sexes in this area is not created by legislation but 
by nature” (ibid at para 14). In Brooks, the Court recognized the need for a more substantive 
approach to equality. On similar facts, but notably during the era of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, a discrepancy in benefits between those unemployed because of maternity as 
opposed to sickness or accident was held to be discriminatory. Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
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Indeed, communitarians, feminist theorists, and others have critiqued Rawls’s 
liberal approach for its lack of appropriate sensitivity to context. This call for 
contextualization asks for attention to the specific characteristics of those making 
the decision and, at other times, to the contextual circumstances of those being 
judged. The critiques of Rawlsian liberalism are particularly helpful in revealing 
contextual elements that may fruitfully be explored when a lack of impartiality is 
alleged in administrative law. In the next section, I present an historical overview 
of significant critiques of Rawlsian liberalism as a means of highlighting some 
of the key ideas that have arisen as more context-sensitive approaches to social 
justice were proposed in moral and political philosophy.
D. CHALLENGES TO RAWLSIAN IMPARTIALITY 
Since the publication of A Theory of Justice, several schools of thought have 
emerged proposing more contextual approaches to determining impartiality in the 
public policy realm, in an attempt to better serve the ends of social justice. These 
critiques of Rawlsian liberalism were launched by, among others, communitar-
ians, contextualists, feminist theorists, and discourse theorists. One of the central 
challenges has been with respect to the plausibility of Rawls’s veil of ignorance. 
Communitarians, for example, assert that community, character, and friendship 
are necessary for a true definition of the self and question whether it is possible 
to choose among conceptions of justice without reference to a prior commitment 
to the good life that stems from one’s intersubjective existence.26 The communi-
tarian critique has served as a prelude to the criticism, launched by contextualist 
scholars, that justice is intimately connected to context and that there may be a 
plurality of contexts to consider simultaneously in reaching a conception of the 
good life.27 Feminist critiques have also been quite strong in asserting that gender 
is a critical aspect of context that must be taken into account.28 
These debates bear some resemblance to the evolution of the Canadian public 
law jurisprudence dealing with the issue of adjudicative bias. Both the discussions 
in political and moral philosophy and those in the courts show movement from 
an approach to justice that centres on blind, universal principles to one that 
is more context-driven. Both also struggle with the tensions that arise when 
26. Michael J Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2d ed (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
27. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism & Equality (New York: Basic Books, 
1983).
28. Susan Hekman, “The Embodiment of the Subject: Feminism and the Communitarian 
Critique of Liberalism” (1992) 54:4 J Pol 1098.
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the resolution of specific situations requires both contextualized and universal 
elements. Finally, the movement in both realms towards more situated contextual 
methodologies shows the promise of providing a more rigorous, transparent, and 
authentic understanding of impartiality. In this section, I outline the debates that 
have arisen over the course of more than four decades in political philosophy 
with respect to the notion of impartiality in the public policy realm.
1.  COMMUNITARIANISM
Communitarians challenged the notion of the deontological self driven by 
acontextual moral duties, which lies at the heart of Rawls’s liberal theory of 
impartiality.29 Michael Sandel, who launched one of the most memorable 
communitarian critiques of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice,30 found the deontological 
ethic implausible. He argued that Rawls’s unencumbered self does not allow for 
intersubjective conceptions of the individual that are essential to the definition 
of a person: 
Intersubjective conceptions allow that in certain moral circumstances, the relevant 
description of the self may embrace more than a single, individual human being, as 
when we attribute responsibility or affirm an obligation to a family or community or 
class or nation rather than to some particular human being… . But we cannot regard 
ourselves as independent in this way without great cost to those loyalties and convic-
tions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable 
29. The debate between the communitarians and Rawlsian liberalists took place primarily in 
the 1980s. It has been said that communitarianism died out in the 1990s. See e.g. Matt 
Matravers, “Review of Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and 
Communitarianism by Rainer Forst” (2004) 113:451 Mind 539. Further, Michael Walzer 
wittily likened the communitarian critique to a fashion trend: transient but certain to return. 
Walzer considers communitarianism to be an intermittent feature of liberal politics and social 
organization. See “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism” (1990) 18:1 Pol Theory 6 
[Walzer, “Communitarian Critique”]. 
30. See Michael J Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2d ed (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). By far, this is the most-referenced communitarian critique. Shane 
O’Neill refers to it as possibly one of the most celebrated critiques of Rawls’s work from a 
communitarian perspective. See O’Neill, supra note 11 at 22. Other communitarians include 
Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor—whose work is said to be inspired by Aristotelian 
notions that shared understandings of the good for the person and his or her community is 
the foundation of any concept of justice, and Roberto Unger, whose critique of liberalism is 
said to find its inspiration in the Hegelian conception of man as a historically conditioned 
being. Alasdair McIntyre After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981); 
Roberto Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1975). These communitarians, 
their inspirations and approaches are discussed by Amy Gutmann. See “Communitarian 
Critics of Liberalism” (1985) 14:3 Phil and Pub Affairs 308.   
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from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are – as members of this 
family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and 
daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic.31 
In other words, the good of the community often figures as a constitutive 
dimension of a person. The liberal insistence that individuals be extracted from 
all moral commitments does not allow for an authentic picture of the self. At its 
heart, the liberal-communitarian debate centres on how we should conceive of 
the person.32 
Communitarians attack the Rawlsian idea that the principles of justice that 
guide our rights do not depend on any particular notion of the good life.33 It 
seems impossible that one’s reflections on justice should be divorced from one’s 
understanding of the good life. Politically speaking, “our deliberations about 
justice and rights cannot proceed without reference to the conceptions of the 
good that find expression in the many cultures and traditions within which 
those deliberations take place.”34 We need something to guide our choices in the 
original position.35 
Another important aspect of the communitarian critique centres on the 
voluntary element embedded in the original position. Some communitarians 
express scepticism about whether we can truly limit ourselves to being bound 
by the ends and roles that we choose for ourselves.36 On the contrary, we are 
sometimes obligated to fulfill ends that we have not chosen but that are imposed 
31. Sandel, supra note 30 at 63, 179.
32. Ibid at 186.
33. See Charles Taylor, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate” in Derek 
Matravers and Jon Pike, eds, Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology 
(London: Routledge, 2005) 195 at 198. Taylor notes that liberalism faces the charge of being 
unrealistic and appropriate only to certain western societies as a result of its exclusion of a 
socially endorsed conception of the good.
34. Ibid.
35. This is not to say that all communitarians argue that rights should be based on the values 
or preferences that prevail in a given community at any given time. Sandel notes that the 
label “communitarianism” is misleading for this reason. Sandel, supra note 30 at 186. While 
some communitarians espouse this view, the more robust debate between the liberalists and 
the communitarians centres on whether the right can truly exist prior to the good—that 
is, whether it is possible to define and defend rights without presupposing any particular 
conception of the good life. Sandel’s new closing chapter in the second edition of Liberalism 
and the Limits of Justice discusses the liberalism-communitarian debate that arose after the 
original publication of his book. See ibid.
36. See e.g. Charles Taylor, “Atomism” in Alkis Kontos, ed, Powers, possessions, and freedom: Essays 
in Honour of CB Macpherson 39. 
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by our identity as members of a family, a people, a culture, et cetera.37 Neverthe-
less, some have defended liberalism against this communitarian challenge. Will 
Kymlicka, for example, has argued that our ultimate goal is to rethink our 
present life projects so that we may live a life that is better than the one we are 
currently pursuing. In this way, we do not necessarily aim to accept that our 
present circumstances are pre-determined, either as individuals or as part of a 
community—rather, they are open to reconsideration, revision, or rejection.38 
Communitarians maintain that use of the deontological self as an ideal limits 
the pursuit of justice in a few ways.39 First, doing so denies the self of character. 
To imagine a person without constitutive attachments is to imagine a person 
who is “wholly without character, without moral depth,”40 and who is incapable 
of self-knowledge in any morally serious way. This may make self-reflection 
impossible and may consequently render the ends sought by the self to be prefer-
ential but morally irrelevant.41 By contrast, a person in the original position is able 
to reach a choice of ends that is less arbitrary when he or she can take preferences 
into account while assessing their suitability in light of his or her constitutive and 
authentic identities.42 Second, the denial of character in the constitutive sense 
also denies friendship. Because it involves receiving and contemplating someone 
else’s perception of them, friendship can help bring one’s self-image to light and 
facilitate knowledge of self.43 Finally, the unencumbered self is an unworkable 
37. Ibid at 187.
38. See Will Kymlicka, “Liberalism and Communitarianism” (1988) 18:2 Can J of Phil 181. 
39. See e.g. Sandel, supra note 30; MacIntyre, supra note 30; Charles Taylor, “The Nature and 
Scope of Distributive Justice” in Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers (Cambridge UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
40. Sandel, supra note 30.
41. Ibid at 180.
42. Ibid. But see Charles Larmore, Book Review of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice by Michael 
J Sandel, (1984) 81:6 J of Phil 336 at 339. Larmore asserts that Sandel’s argument about 
character is unclear. He points out that Sandel does not specify whether an individual 
is unable to conceive of her or himself in the absence of constitutive attachments to the 
community or whether he or she is unwilling to do so. He further notes that Sandel offers no 
support for his assertion that commitments of character are related to moral depth. Gutmann 
similarly argues that Sandel and other communitarians do not defend communitarianism 
directly and that their critiques of liberalism do not succeed in demonstrating that it has 
a weak foundation. See Gutmann, supra note 30. Walzer additionally observes that the 
communitarians present two main critiques of liberalism that conflict fundamentally 
with one another. One suggests that liberal political theory reflects liberal social practice. 
The other suggests that liberal political theory largely misinterprets real life. See Walzer, 
“Communitarian Critique,” supra note 29.
43. Sandel, supra note 30 at 181.
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model. Rawls states that “the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by 
it.”44 However, communitarians insist that a person who is divorced from his 
or her community ties cannot choose a conception of the good, because she or 
he is atomistic. They also argue that our personhood is partly made up of our 
conception of a good life and that more emphasis should therefore be laid on 
“constitutive projects and attachments.”45 
With respect to role played by legal decision makers, communitarianism 
offers a more imaginative understanding of the importance of constitutive 
attachments as well as community and community-shared norms.
2. CONTEXTUALISM
The contextualists conceptualize the concerns raised by the communitarians 
differently. Both stress the importance of community, but whereas communitar-
ians focus on the constitutive role that community plays with regard to the self, 
contextualists argue that the principles of justice themselves are dependent on the 
shared understandings that exist within particular communities. Michael Walzer, 
one of the foremost thinkers in contextualism, advocated for a conception 
of justice that he called “complex equality.”46 Since justice depends on local 
understandings and is pluralistic in nature, it is not possible to have a universal 
principle or set of principles that lead to justice. As Walzer put it:
It’s not only a matter of implementing some singular principle or set of principles 
in different historical settings. … I want to argue for more than this: that the prin-
ciples of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that different social goods ought 
to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by 
different agents; and that all these differences derive from different understandings 
of the social goods themselves – the inevitable product of historical and cultural 
particularism.47
At issue is the plurality of cultures and the particularity that each culture 
shows in understanding and distributing its goods. The only way to produce 
principles of justice that reflect these aspects is for each community to interpret 
their shared understandings of the goods to be distributed and the most just 
way of doing so. Although Walzer’s method aimed to provide a more authentic, 
context-sensitive understanding of justice, it has also been criticized for rejecting 
44. Rawls, supra note 3 at 560.
45. Sandel, supra note 30 at 181.
46. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism & Equality (New York: Basic Books, 
1983).
47. Ibid at 6. See also Michael Walzer, “Philosophy and Democracy” (1981) 9:3 Pol Theory 379. 
For an overview of Walzer’s work generally see William A Galston, “Community, Democracy, 
Philosophy: The Political Thought of Michael Walzer” (1989) 17 Pol Theory 119.
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universal principles in favour of an approach that is overly context-dependent.48 
As discussed in the next section, feminist critiques have countered concerns 
about context dependency by reconceiving the nature of the relationship between 
particularity and universalism. Overall, contextualism is relevant to legal decision 
making insofar as it stresses the value of local understandings and the shifting or 
flexible nature of impartiality depending on the communities being judged.
3. FEMINIST CRITIQUES
There are similarities between the feminist and communitarian critiques of 
liberalism, including that both advocate for a subject that is constituted rather 
than constituting49 and connected rather than autonomous. However, aspects of 
the feminist critique are distinct.50 Several major arguments can be taken from a 
reading of the feminist literature responding to Rawlsian liberalism.51 When read 
alongside discourses of impartiality in adjudication, feminist theory is especially 
useful for its emphasis on connection (a holistic appreciation of those engaged in 
discourse) and on the value that it places on grounded universalization. 
Feminist theorists tend to discuss the themes of gender and essentialism.52 
One idea that prevails in the feminist critique is that the Rawlsian approach favours 
48. For critiques of Walzer’s approach see O’Neill, supra note 11 at ch 3 (“Hermeneutics 
and Justice”); Rainer Forst, Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and 
Communitarianism, translated by John MM Farrell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002).
49. That is, a subject that is embedded in a community’s principles of social justice rather than 
one that is creating them.  
50. See generally, Susan Hekman, “The Embodiment of the Subject: Feminism and the 
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism” (1992) 50:4 J Pol 1098 [Hekman, “The 
Embodiment of the Subject”].
51. The following significant feminist critiques and discussions have been considered: Benhabib, 
“The Generalized and the Concrete Other,” supra note 23 at 77; Iris Marion Young, 
“Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral 
and Political Theory” in Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell, eds, Feminism as Critique: 
On the Politics of Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 56 [Young, 
“Impartiality]; Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 
(especially “Part III – Some Mistakes about Impartiality”); Susan Hekman, ibid; O’Neill, 
supra note 11 (especially the section “The Feminist Challenge”); Carol Gilligan, In a Different 
Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993); Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of 
Gender (Berkeley: University of California, 1978); Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and 
the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise (New York: Harper & Row, 1976). 
52. Hekman, “The Embodiment of the Subject,” supra note 50 at 1099. Essentialism and the 
related notion of identity, especially group identity, have developed into important themes 
of their own. See Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 
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a way of reasoning that is associated, implicitly or explicitly, with masculinity. 
Iris Marion Young, for instance, highlighted the distinction between reason and 
desire that is inherent in the process of impartial reasoning. The Rawlsian subject 
is a rational one that has removed itself from desire, affectivity, and the body. 
Young suggests that, as a consequence, desire is seen as irrational. Furthermore, 
to the extent that women are affected by these elements or incorporate them in 
their judgment, their decision-making processes are seen as impure and inferior.53 
Academics such as Carol Gilligan, Nancy Chodorow, and Dorothy Dinnerstein 
furthered the theory that rationality is a trait more strongly associated with male 
than female development. They concluded that women are discouraged from 
developing the traits of rationality, separation, and autonomy while men are 
encouraged to do so. As a result, women become connected subjects, constituted 
through an ethics based on caring and their connections with others.54 Since these 
traits are viewed with suspicion in a world of objective rationality, the reasoning 
processes associated with them are rejected. Affect, emotion, and connections 
with others are therefore limited to the private sphere, segregated from public 
fora of deliberation, despite potentially providing valuable insights for judging.
Another significant feminist challenge to liberalism focuses on the use of 
a generalized other in creating universal principles of justice. Theorists such 
as Benhabib have criticized the universality that liberalism defends because 
it generalizes from the experiences of non-human (or fictitious) selves. The 
individuals placed behind the theoretical veil of ignorance have had all their 
individuating characteristics removed, with no qualities to distinguish one from 
the other. In Benhabib’s words: “[W]hat we are left with is an empty mask that 
is everyone and no one.”55 As she suggests, this removal of difference means that 
there is no true human plurality in the original position. Because the Rawlsian 
process involves making decisions by placing oneself in the position of another 
disembodied self, the process appears incoherent: There is no other behind 
the veil of ignorance, just several selves similarly constituted. For this reason, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Iris Marion Young, “Difference as a Resource 
for Democratic Communication” in James Bohman & William Rehg, eds, Deliberative 
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997) 383 [Young, 
“Difference for Democratic Communication”].
53. Young, “Impartiality,” supra note 52 at 62-63.
54. See Gilligan, supra note 52; Chodorow, supra note 52; Dinnerstein, supra note 52; Barry, 
supra note 52 at 236-37.
55. Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other,” supra note 23 at 89.
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Benhabib termed the Rawlsian process “substitutionalist.”56 Not requiring 
those behind the veil of ignorance to speak from a perspective that stresses their 
commonalities and differences denies the opportunity to gain the rich intersub-
jective insights that would result from being forced to address what it is that 
makes us different. Doing so would allow for more grounded attempts at univer-
salization.57 Understanding how individuals are different requires incorporating 
their varying viewpoints in the original position. In identifying the desires of 
individuals in the original position, it is necessary to know something about the 
person who holds these desires. In other words, it is important to account for 
difference in deducing universal principles.
Theorists such as Benhabib have argued that if universalization entails 
grouping similar situations together and extracting general principles from them, 
then it is necessary to know more about the individuals in the original position, 
including their histories and moral attitudes, in order to determine if the moral 
situations about which they are deciding are like others:
While every procedure of universalizability presupposes that ‘like cases ought to 
be treated alike’ or that I should act in such a way I should also be willing that all 
others in a like situation act like me, the most difficult aspect of any such procedure 
is to know what constitutes a ‘like’ situation or what it would mean for another to 
be exactly in a situation like mine. Such a process of reasoning, to be at all viable, 
must involve the viewpoint of the concrete other, for situations … do not come like 
‘envelopes and golden finches,’ ready for definition and description… .58
Rawls’s theory presupposes a singular self who imagines himself or herself 
in the position of the other, an approach that Benhabib terms “monological.”59 
56. A term coined by Benhabib to describe the theories of Kant and Rawls in which rational 
agents, placed behind epistemic strictures of ignorance, would agree. Substitutionalists treat 
individuals in a generalized fashion in order to point to universal truths. See Benhabib, supra 
note 23 at 82.
57. See also Shane O’Neill’s discussion of this question. O’Neill, supra note 11 at 52-54. 
58. Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other,” supra note 23 at 90-91.
59. Interestingly, the feminist challenges to liberalism have been countered by the argument 
that feminists and liberalists are not addressing the same issue. Brian Barry, for instance, 
maintains that feminists and liberalists are parties to an ill-joined debate. Feminists are 
concerned with using impartiality as a basic principle of everyday life. They believe that 
moral situations exist in which it is legitimate to favour one person over another. Often such 
situations deal with the claims that can be made between family members and others in close 
relationships. Their critique is therefore of the notion that all must be treated the same way. 
Barry suggests, however, that the notion of impartiality espoused by liberalists and others 
in the impartialist camp is not designed to make impartiality a complete rule for everyday 
living. Barry concludes that not only is the debate between the liberalists and feminists 
ill-joined in this respect, but both parties have valid points of view. See Barry, supra note 51. 
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Instead, she argues that moral decisions should be based on mediations between 
concrete individuals, insisting that it is necessary to assume “the standpoint of the 
concrete other”60 in order to reach meaningful conclusions about what would be 
acceptable by all.
4. DISCOURSE THEORY
As an alternative to the original position (which is founded on autonomous, 
generalized, constituting agents) and building on the relational ideas of feminist 
theorists, many critics have proposed a theory of justice based on genuine rather 
than hypothetical discourse. Discourse theory conceives of actual dialogue 
among participants involved in developing principles of justice. It thereby offers 
a means of avoiding the pitfalls of liberalism identified by communitarians, 
contextualists, and feminists. The work of Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas 
has inspired the move towards discourse. Foucault’s ideas of resistance and the 
discursive subject draw attention to the ways in which contending discourses 
interact to produce differing identities, whereas Habermas’s theory of communi-
cative action is a strong source for the notion that discussion and consensus are 
key to a political democracy.
Foucault’s conception of the discursive subject furthers his theory of 
resistance by challenging spaces that have been constructed for groups in 
society by those who are more powerful.61 Described as “both constructed and 
creative,”62 the discursive subject takes from the manifold discourses that exist in 
society—such as liberalism, femininity, motherhood, equality, and rationality—
in order to constitute itself. The subject is constantly creating itself “out of the 
resources available to members of the culture, to speakers of the language and 
the multiplicity of discourses that comprise a language and culture.”63 When 
considered within the context of the challenges that liberalism and communitari-
Mendus responds to Barry by arguing that although the differences between impartialists 
and their critics run very deep, reconciliation is possible and “its possibility lies in a form of 
impartialism which accords centrality to partial concerns.” Susan Mendus, Impartiality in 
Moral and Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 2. Mendus 
suggests that it is important to consider the origin and extent of impartialism’s motivational 
power, which she argues is its ability to accommodate the partial concerns we have for others.
60. Benhabib, “The Generalized and the Concrete Other,” supra note 23 at 91.
61. See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980); Michel Foucault, 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). See also Susan 
Hekman’s discussion of Foucault and his use of the discursive self in addressing feminist 
challenges to liberalism. Hekman, supra note 51 at 1113-17.
62. Ibid at 1113.
63. Ibid at 1116. 
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anism pose to gender, for example, the discursive subject is a progressive step. As 
compared to liberalism, there is no essential masculine-oriented self that is seen as 
standard and that relegates difference (including the difference of femininity) to a 
lower hierarchical level. Similarly, the notion of the discursive self eliminates the 
communitarian concern with respect to determinism: The danger of adopting a 
fixed, pre-conceived role for women and other groups that has been constituted 
by community or society can be avoided. Groups are thus able to create a new 
discourse or, given the plurality within any one group, even a multiplicity of 
discourses.  
Aspects of Habermas’s communicative action theory have been even more 
influential than Foucault’s discursive subject in developing a dialogic alternative 
to Rawlsian liberalism. Habermas’s theory is premised on the notion that public 
deliberations in which consensus is reached constitute the process through which 
norms can be democratically created.64 Unlike Rawls, Habermas opposed the 
idea that universal guiding principles can be developed from an abstracted point 
of view. The principles that are developed through communicative action are 
said to be universal precisely because they represent a collective, consensual 
expression of will brought about through real dialogue. Furthermore, under the 
Habermasian approach, even the rules of discourse themselves can be questioned 
and reconstructed by the participants. This can be valuable in addressing power 
imbalances in the deliberations caused by gender, culture, or other differences. 
While his approach shares common ground with contextualism in that both 
stress sensitivity to context, Habermas believes more strongly in the potential 
for the principles of social justice to have a universal reach if developed using his 
dialogic model. His project also aims to be more sensitive to the fact that there 
are plural viewpoints within a community.65 
64. Habermas expounds his theory in works including Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action, translated by Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1990); The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, translated by Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a 
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1998) [Habermas, Between Facts and Norms]. See also Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory 
of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978); William Rehg, Insight and Solidarity: 
A Study in the Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994).
65. Shane O’Neill provides an excellent discussion of the values of Habermasian discourse ethics 
over the approaches proposed by Rawls and Walzer. See O’Neill, supra note 11. Rainer 
Forst also lauds the Habermasian approach. See Forst, supra note 48. A rich literature—that 
this article can hardly begin to engage with, let alone do justice to—has grown around the 
Rawls-Habermas debate. See e.g. James Gordon Finlayson & Fabian Freyenhagen, eds, 
JACOBS, FROM RAWLS TO HABERMAS 563
Habermas has also expanded his theory of communicative action to address 
legal adjudication and institutional design. In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas 
set out to examine, among other things, the plausibility of his discourse theory 
from the perspective of legal theory.66 His aim was to determine whether law 
in the narrow sense, which he defines as incorporating “all interactions that are 
not only oriented to law but also geared to produce and reproduce law,”67 is 
capable of supporting a discourse theory, particularly with respect to the process 
of adjudication. The perspective he examines within the legal system is that of the 
judge, which Habermas considers the privileged point of view in legal theory.68 
In developing his theory, Habermas takes issue with Dworkin’s idea of a 
“Herculean” judge, who has mastered all the jurisprudence and has knowledge of 
all the valid principles and policies at his disposal.69 As an expert in the field of law, 
he is thus able to unearth a single right answer for every legal problem brought 
before him.70 Habermas’s main critique of Dworkin’s Herculean judge is that his 
Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political (New York: Routledge, 2011); Todd Hedrick, 
Rawls and Habermas: Reason, Pluralism, and the Claims of Political Philosophy (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010).
66. See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 64 at 195. Habermas outlines his 
discourse theory of law primarily in chapter 5.
67. Ibid at 195. Habermas observes that several institutions are involved in the production and 
reproduction of law, including courts and administrative agencies “insofar as they exercise a 
rather broad discretion” (ibid at 195-96). He considers political legislation to have a central 
function. As some, including Hugh Baxter, note, this makes his choice to examine legal 
discourse from the perspective of judges somewhat strange. I would argue even further 
that highlighting the centrality of political legislation opens the door invitingly to using 
administrative agencies as sites for examining whether discourse theory is plausible within 
the legal system. See Hugh Baxter, “Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy” 
(2002) 50:1 Buff L Rev 205.
68. But Habermas notes that legal theory is wider than adjudication and extends to legislation 
and administration. As well, he asserts that legal theory takes into account the perspectives 
of the other participants of the legal order such as political legislators, administrators, private 
legal persons, citizens, and judges. See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 64 at 
196-97.
69. He also critiques Hart’s positivist notion of primary and secondary rules and the legal realist 
notion that law cannot be separated from the political values of individual judges (thereby 
demolishing, in its entirety, the notions of certainty and rational acceptability).
70. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 24. An interesting critique of Dworkin’s legal 
theory, as it would pertain to administrative tribunals, is given by Margaret Allars. See “On 
Deference to Tribunals with Deference to Dworkin” (1995-1996) 20:1 Queen’s LJ 163. 
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approach to decision making is monological.71 Hercules converses with no one 
but himself in reaching his decisions—not even other judges, as would be the case 
on an appellate bench. Habermas acknowledges that a society generally wants its 
judges to reach their own opinions and to defend them. However, this can only 
succeed if the judge, due to “professional knowledge and skills and thanks to her 
personal virtues,” can act as the “citizens’ representative.”72 Habermas believes 
that more is needed to incorporate community representation into adjudica-
tion. As a solution, Habermas proposes an intersubjective discourse theory that 
ensures communication between the citizenry and the legal community.73 It is 
not sufficient for a single judge to rely on an expertise that stems solely from 
the standards and practices of a legal community. Rather, it is necessary to bring 
the community’s self-understanding into dialogue with the legal expertise of the 
judge. To this end, Habermas offers a procedure for argumentation within the 
courtroom that allows for more public interest contributions. 
While Habermas’s notion of public interest intervention is not new, his ideas 
invite reflection on how a theory of legal discourse that builds on fundamental 
notions of participation, intersubjective dialogue, community, and consensus 
could be further developed. It is compelling not only to examine the question of 
legitimacy and impartial decision making in traditional judicial settings but also 
to do so with respect to a wider array of public law decision-making contexts in 
our own society. Certainly, bringing a wider plurality of perspectives to bear on 
any given issue can serve to reach a more legitimate conception of social justice, 
whether in the courtroom or in the socio-political arena.
E. SUMMARY
In conclusion, the philosophical question of how best to determine the guiding 
principles of social justice has evolved significantly over the past four decades. 
At its core, the question has remained one about impartiality: how to decide 
impartially between competing conceptions of the good espoused by members 
of a pluralistic society. There has been a movement away from addressing this 
concern through liberal theories based on disembodied autonomy to theories 
based on embodiment and discourse. While these theoretical debates started 
broadly as theories of justice in political and moral philosophy, one sees, particu-
71. See Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 64 at s 5.3.1.
72. Ibid at 222.
73. Habermas states that legal theory should be an exercise of “expanding relations of mutual 
recognition among natural persons into the abstract juridical relationship of mutual 
recognition among legal persons.” See ibid at 223.
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larly with Habermas’s work on discourse theory, that these debates have entered 
legal theory as well. The first part of this article has addressed the theoretical 
aspects of impartiality and justice. But what about the concrete functioning of 
courts and administrative bodies on a day-to-day basis? Generally, deliberations 
about allegation of bias within judicial and administrative law are a site where 
liberal values come up against a desire to find contextual understandings. In the 
next Part, I argue that drawing on the contextualized movement from Rawlsian 
liberalism to Habermasian legal discourse theory can provide a promising start to 
resolving this tension, and I propose a theory of grounded impartiality as a means 
of reconciling the issues at play in the administrative law context.  
III. IMPARTIALITY IN CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. A THEORY OF GROUNDED IMPARTIALITY
In this part, I argue that the current approach to determining impartiality in 
administrative law would benefit from principles derived from the context-driven 
critiques of Rawlsian liberalism made by critical political and moral theorists. 
A fresh approach would ground the inquiry into reasonable apprehension of 
bias in a set of clear, prescriptive indicia. These indicia encompass five factors, 
though the presence of any one of these factors does not automatically mean 
that an apprehension of bias is reasonable. Each factor may be scrutinized for 
what it shows about the impartiality of a particular administrative actor’s74 
decision making and in light of the factual circumstances that have given rise 
to the allegation. Some factors may be more relevant than others and it may 
be that not all five factors will be useful or necessary, depending on the factual 
situation. An assessment of which factors are most relevant may be made at the 
outset of the analysis. In addition to their use by judges on judicial review, the 
five factors may also be useful to administrative actors themselves in assessing 
whether a reasonable apprehension of bias exists when litigants before them make 
such allegations.
74. These decision-making bodies will be synonymously termed “administrative actors” and 
“administrative decision makers” throughout this article. “Administrative actor” and 
“administrative decision maker” are global terms used to denote decision makers in both 
their institutional and individual senses. See, generally WA Bogart, “The Tools of the 
Administrative State and the Regulatory Mix” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, 
Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008).
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The first factor is the provenance of the administrative actor, including its 
policy origins, legislative framework,75 and family likenesses. This factor stems 
from the communitarian critiques of Rawlsian liberalism that stressed the 
importance of considering the constitutive attachments of a decision maker in 
determining questions of fairness. The contemplation of the legislative or other 
origins of an administrative body, its policy goals, and any significant traits that 
it may share with other administrative actors of the same nature (for example, 
Ministers of the executive and legislative/parliamentary officers, investiga-
tory agencies, and arms-length independent agencies of the executive branch 
of government) may prove useful in deciding whether or not an allegation of 
disqualifying bias is reasonable. As the communitarians have noted, assessing the 
decision-maker’s preferences in light of its constitutive identity or identities can 
assist a determination of fairness.
The second factor is the shared understandings and institutional culture 
(including institutional practices) in which the individuals who perform the 
work of the administrative body are embedded. This factor, which also originates 
from the communitarian critique of liberalism, suggests that one should strive 
to comprehend the norms within the institution, which may have a significant 
role in shaping an administrative body’s collective conception of the work that it 
does. Institutional norms, which are often implicit rather than express, develop 
through the repeated discretionary actions of an administrative agency or other 
administrative body and form part of its ethos. Knowledge of institutional norms 
may facilitate an evaluation of whether a particular conception of fairness should 
be given credence. The main issue to be addressed will be whether the institu-
tional norms can be legitimized by the legislative framework that enables the 
administrative actor either by express legislative wording or as a development 
of the administrative body’s expertise in light of its enabling legislation.76 A 
shared understanding of what is appropriate may not, in and of itself, excuse 
situations that would otherwise clearly lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias, 
but it may offer avenues for additional exploration of the administrative body’s 
understanding of procedural fairness. Institutional norms may or may not act as 
barriers to fairness, but a frank assessment of their presence in the administra-
tive body and the impact they have will inevitably lead to a more thorough and 
transparent engagement with the question of impartiality.
75. Other constitutive sources outside of legislation may equally be pertinent (e.g., crown 
prerogative or executive discretion). 
76. Ibid. 
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The third factor consists of local understandings—that is, those jointly 
held by the administrative actor and the regulated community it is empowered 
to oversee. Local understandings may concern technical subject matter as well 
as notions of fairness within that community. In line with the contextualists’ 
suggestions, local understandings highlight the fact that the principles of justice—
namely, what may constitute impartiality in any administrative law context—may 
be flexible. What this factor adds to current principles of administrative law, 
however, is the idea that one should look to understandings of fairness that are 
shared between the administrative actor and the relevant regulated community as 
part of the determination of what impartiality should mean within that decision-
making context. However, in considering local understandings, a reviewing court 
should pay equal attention to the potentially problematic issue of agency capture 
disguised as local understandings.
The fourth factor, which concerns any connections that exist between the 
administrative actor and the litigants or their counsel, has traditionally been 
flagged in the administrative law jurisprudence as a potential reason to doubt 
a decision-maker’s impartiality. Nonetheless, the feminist response to Rawls’s 
theory of justice suggests that connections can cut both ways. Connections 
between administrative decision makers and litigants may raise impartiality 
concerns, but they may also lead to relationships that are fair. It may be that 
prior knowledge of the litigant prompts the decision maker to consider issues 
more carefully. Feminist analysis gives a more sophisticated spin to the reason 
for examining the connections, if any, that exist between the administrative actor 
and the litigants or their counsel, the nature and extent of those connections, and 
their impact on the process.
Lastly, the fifth factor, discourse—or the extent to which a meaningful 
exchange about the issue(s) at hand can take place between the administrative 
actor and the parties—is of prime importance to the question of impartiality, 
though it has not been identified as such in Canadian administrative law 
jurisprudence. The critiques of classic liberalism brought by discourse theorists 
suggest that impartiality is furthered by the participation of a plurality of relevant 
perspectives. A grounded approach to administrative impartiality will always aim 
to examine the central question of whether the circumstances giving rise to the 
allegation of disqualifying bias will act as a hindrance to a meaningful dialogue 
among parties, administrative actors, and any interveners. Furthermore, drawing 
on Foucault’s notion of the discursive subject, a person alleging disqualifying 
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bias, especially attitudinal bias, should recognize that individuals are constantly 
re-creating themselves, drawing from the multiple discourses around them and 
the cultures with which they engage. This poses a particular challenge to the way 
in which attitudinal bias is examined. The notion that one who has held a past 
position—be it an affiliation with a particular group, a scholar who has promoted 
a school of thought, et cetera—is incapable of having an open mind should be 
tested more rigorously in light of the constant re-creation of the self suggested by 
discourse theorists.77 
The ultimate objective of the theory of grounded impartiality is to encourage 
a more rigorous and complete analysis of reasonable apprehension of bias claims 
by providing a set of factors with which to probe and examine such claims in 
a more nuanced, contextualized manner. The five factors are non-exhaustive; 
depending on the circumstances, others may also be relevant. In the sections 
that follow, I first briefly explain that a context-sensitive approach has been 
endorsed for traditional situations in which an individual judge’s actions may 
be scrutinized for reasonable apprehension of bias. I then move to the central 
preoccupation of this Part of the article, which is to illustrate how the factors of 
the grounded theory apply and what their impact on judicial review would be. 
To do this, I consider critically five key SCC cases on reasonable apprehension of 
bias in administrative law. 
B. THE IMPARTIALITY OF JUDGES AND CONTEXTUALIZATION 
The 1997 case of R v RDS78 was significant for establishing the Court’s position 
on bringing social context into the evaluation of the impartiality of judges. In 
RDS, the Court found contextualized decision making to be acceptable both 
where judges decide matters of fairness before them and in judicial review of a 
judge’s discretion where their contextualized judging may be perceived as bias. 
The case considered the degree to which a trial judge could take contextual 
factors into account in evaluating evidence. The decision clarified the case law 
and offered normative guidance to lower court judges. RDS is interesting from 
a philosophical standpoint because, like the debate between Rawlsian liberalists 
and communitarians, it shows movement towards embodied decision making 
and highlights the pitfalls of determinism.  
77. See e.g. Bill C-520, An Act supporting non-partisan agents of Parliament, 1st session, 51st Parl, 
2014. This private member’s bill proposes that every person applying for a position in the 
office of an agent of Parliament declare whether they occupied specified politically partisan 
positions in the ten years leading up to their application for that position. 
78. [1997] 3 SCR 484, 161 NSR (2d) [RDS].
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At issue in RDS was whether a trial judge’s comments on the racial dynamics 
of policing in Nova Scotia, made during the course of her reasons for decision, 
gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.79 Corrine Sparks, a black judge, 
had heard conflicting testimony about the arrest of a black youth by a white 
officer in Nova Scotia. The officer and the young man were the only ones to 
testify at trial, and their stories diverged significantly. Ultimately, the judge found 
the testimony of the young man to be more credible. In delivering her reasons, 
she addressed a rhetorical comment made by the Crown while questioning why 
the officer would have recounted the events the way he did if they were not true. 
Among other statements, Judge Sparks said that while she was not saying that 
this police officer had misled the court, officers had been known to do so in the 
past. She added that she knew that police officers do overreact, especially when 
dealing with non-white groups. Finally, she stated that she believed the evidence 
of RDS that he had been told to “shut up” or he would be under arrest because it 
was in keeping with the prevalent attitude of the day.80 
Impartiality in the public law realm requires the decision maker to have 
an open mind and not to decide in his or her own interest, in a manner that 
unduly favours one of the parties, or pursuant to irrelevant factors. The issue is 
ultimately about fairness to the litigants. The test for reasonable apprehension 
of bias considers what a reasonable observer, who is fully informed of all the 
79. The RDS decision generated much discussion in the academic literature as it wound its way 
through the courts. See e.g. Carol A Aylward, “‘Take the Long Way Home’ R.D.S. v. R. The 
Journey” (1998) 47 UNBLJ 249; Christine Boyle et al, “R v. R.D.S.: An Editor’s Forum” 
(1998) 10:1 CJWL 159; April Burey, “No Dichotomies: Reflections on Equality for African 
Canadians in R v. R.D.S.” (1998) 21:1 Dal LJ 199; Richard F Devlin, “We Can’t Go on 
Together with Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias and Racialized Perspective in R v. R.D.S.” 
(1995) 18:2 Dal LJ 408; Allan Hutchinson & Kathleen Strachan, “What’s the Difference - 
Interpretation, Identity and R. v. R.D.S.” (1998) 21:1 Dal LJ 219; Sherene Razack, “R.D.S. v. 
Her Majesty the Queen: A Case about Home” (1997-1998) 9:3 Constitutional Forum 59; and 
Jennifer Smith, “R. v. R.D.S.: A Political Science Perspective” (1998) 21:1 Dal LJ 236.
80. Judge Sparks also made ambiguous comments about whether this officer had overreacted and 
about his state of mind:
I am not saying that the Constable has misled the court, although police officers have been 
known to do that in the past. I am not saying that the officer overreacted, but certainly police 
officers do overreact, particularly when they are dealing with non-white groups. That to me 
indicates a state of mind right there that is questionable. I believe that probably the situation 
in this particular case is the case of a young police officer who overreacted. I do accept the 
evidence of [R.D.S.] that he was told to shut up or he would be under arrest. It seems to be in 
keeping with the prevalent attitude of the day. … At any rate, based upon my comments and 
based upon all the evidence before the court, I have no other choice but to acquit.
 RDS, supra note 79 at para 4.
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circumstances and is not overly sensitive, would think upon viewing the situation 
realistically and practically, and after having thought the matter through.81 In 
RDS, the lower courts found that Judge Sparks’ comments gave rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias. At the Supreme Court, however, the majority found that 
the impugned comments did not attract a perception of bias. The Court was 
divided, however, with majority and minority concurring reasons for judgment 
as well as a dissent.82 
Essential to determining the bias issue was the question of whether it was 
reasonable for Judge Sparks to have referred to her understanding of the social 
context and the racial dynamics at play in Nova Scotia at the time. In other 
words, to what extent should a judge allow her life experiences to assist her 
in determining matters of credibility? One might equally see this question as 
probing the degree to which a judge can be embodied—that is, reflective of the 
community to which she belongs and the experiences that she has lived.  
A liberal perspective would suggest that the only way for a judge in Corinne 
Sparks’ position to render a fair decision would be to strip her decision making of 
all influences that stem from being a black woman in Nova Scotia. From a liberal 
viewpoint, such experiences would be inimical to an impartial finding. By paying 
attention to race, Judge Sparks was potentially favouring a particular perception 
of what is just (namely, equality for African-Canadians) at the expense of other 
valid claims (for example, equality for other racialized groups).
Nevertheless, RDS exemplifies the value of contextualized judging. The 
approach taken by Judge Sparks reflects the theory of the communitarians 
who highlight the impossibility of seeing oneself other than as constituted by 
one’s own community. By extension, one’s opinions on what constitutes justice 
are rooted in community links as much as they are in individualism. Judge 
81. The test originated in Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board, [1978] 
1 SCR 369, 68 DLR (3d) 716 [Committee for Justice and Liberty]. Although originally 
formulated in dissent, it has since been adopted consistently in Canada as the test for 
determining if a reasonable apprehension of bias exists.
82. Four members of the majority (Justices La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, and 
McLachlin) agreed that an awareness of the context in which a case takes place is consistent 
with the highest tradition of judicial impartiality and found that the comments were 
appropriate. Two members of the majority (Justices Cory and Iacobucci) found that the 
comments were close to the line but acceptable when read within the context of the entire 
trial. They also found that Judge Sparks had conducted an acceptable review of all the 
evidence before making the impugned comments. Finally, the three dissenting judges (Chief 
Justice Lamer, and Justices Sopinka and Major) found that the comments gave rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of bias since they had been substituted for evidence.
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Sparks’ approach to justice was guided by a conception of equality informed 
by her identity as a member of the black community. Her conception of justice 
accounted for the difficulty in achieving equality without an initial recognition of 
the fact that incidents, including interactions between police and the public, do 
not always take place on a level playing field. Immutable personal factors such as 
race can have an impact on interpersonal or intra-community relationships. An 
analysis drawn from the communitarian critique of liberalism would suggest that 
taking social factors into account in this way does not necessarily suggest bias; by 
contrast, it can help to render better informed decisions. 
In RDS, both the majority and the dissenting justices agreed that life 
experience can be useful in judicial decision making. However, the majority 
concurring opinion is much more forceful in its approval of the use of this type 
of contextual adjudication and reference to life experience. As a general principle, 
the majority found that the concept of judicial impartiality recognizes that the 
different experiences of judges will assist them in their decision making and be 
reflected in their judgments.83 They found that conscious, contextual inquiry 
actually furthers judicial impartiality because judging genuinely involves an 
“enlargement of the mind.”84 The better able a judge is to take into account 
the perspectives of all those involved, the more successful he or she becomes at 
escaping the blindness of her subjective, private perspective.85 
In applying these principles to the facts of this particular case, the four justices 
of the majority concurring opinion86 were careful to note that Judge Sparks’ 
comments had been made “after she had found R.D.S. to be credible, and [had] 
accepted a sufficient portion of his evidence to leave her with a reasonable doubt 
as to his guilt.”87 The implication seems to be there may have been a different 
result if the comments had been made before her conclusions on credibility had 
been reached. With respect to one specific comment made by Judge Sparks—
that the officer probably overreacted—the four justices showed openness to the 
83. RDS, supra note 79 at para 29.
84. Ibid at paras 42-44.
85. In reaching this opinion, the court adopted the views of Jennifer Nedelsky. See “Embodied 
Diversity and the Challenges to Law” (1997) 42:2 McGill LJ 91. For a critique of the 
decisions reached by both the majority and dissenting judges, see Richard Devlin & Dianne 
Pothier, “Redressing the Imbalances: Rethinking the Judicial Role after R. v. R.D.S.” 
(1999-2000) 31:1 Ottawa L Rev 1.
86. By “majority concurring” I mean the concurring judgment with the most judges signed onto 
it. Likewise, a “minority concurring” judgment is the concurring judgment with fewer judges 
signed onto it. 
87. RDS, supra note 79 at para 53.
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possibility of using social context in helping to determine credibility and assess 
evidence:
While it seems clear that Judge Sparks did not in fact relate the officer’s probable 
overreaction to the race of the appellant R.D.S., it should be noted that if Judge 
Sparks had chosen to attribute the behaviour of Constable Stienburg to the racial 
dynamics of the situation, she would not necessarily have erred. As a member of 
the community, it was open to her to take into account the well-known presence of 
racism in that community and to evaluate the evidence as to what occurred against 
that background.88 
The approach is quite different from that of the minority concurring 
justices and of dissenting justices, who strongly opposed comments that give 
even the appearance that a judge has made a finding based on “generalization” 
or “propensity.”89 The majority and minority reasons highlight lines where 
contextualism may slip into determinism. Distinct from Rawls’s concern that an 
embodied perspective will bring about self-preference, the minority concurring 
and dissenting opinions in RDS display apprehensiveness about introducing 
contextual factors that allow pre-judgments based on stereotypes. At the same 
time, the majority concurring opinion emphasizes the importance of contextual 
factors not just with respect to the decision maker (here, in the sense of encouraging 
reference to relevant life experience of the judge) but also with regard to the 
litigant whose case must also be understood in light of its factual, social, and 
psychological background.90 In RDS, the Court moved towards contextualized 
appreciations of impartiality in the judicial context. The shift towards accepting 
contextualized appreciations of impartiality is murkier, however, in administra-
tive law. This is ironic as administrative law is founded on the idea that flexibility 
in judicial review is crucial given the myriad contexts in which administrative 
actors operate.91 Nevertheless, the SCC remains overwhelmingly liberal in its 
88. Ibid at para 56.
89. Ibid at para 7.
90. Ibid. Post-RDS, there was continued interest in the academic literature on how to incorporate 
context in a principled manner. See, for example, Robert J Currie, “The Contextualised 
Court: Litigating ‘culture’ in Canada” (2005) 9:2 Int’l J Evid & Proof 73.
91. See e.g. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 
DLR (4th) (proposing a multifactor test for determining the appropriate level of procedural 
fairness); Canada Pacific Ltd v Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 SCR 3, 37 DLR 283 
[Matsqui] (holding that “tribunals” should be conceived as a basket that incorporates a wide 
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approach to determining questions of impartiality in the administrative law 
context. In the next section, I examine this paradox more closely.
C. APPLYING A THEORY OF GROUNDED IMPARTIALITY TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTORS
The concept of impartiality refers to the decision-maker’s state of mind... . The de-
cision-maker must approach the issue submitted to him or her with an open mind, 
not influenced by personal interests or outside pressure. It is not sufficient that the 
decision-maker be impartial in his or her own mind, internally, to the satisfaction 
of his or her own conscience. It is also necessary that the decision-maker appear 
impartial in the objective view of a reasonable and well-informed observer… . The 
duty of impartiality, which originated with the judiciary, has now become part of 
the principles of administrative justice.92
Drawing on the theory of grounded administrative impartiality outlined 
above, this section examines the current approach to determining impartiality 
in Canadian administrative law and how an awareness of Rawlsian liberalism 
and its critiques can contribute to the development of our administrative law 
jurisprudence. I complete this analysis, in large part, by critically re-reading five 
major SCC decisions on reasonable apprehension of bias through the lens of the 
theory of grounded impartiality.
Impartiality is unequivocally of fundamental importance in Canadian public 
law. The right to trial by an impartial tribunal is constitutionally enshrined in 
the Charter.93 Similarly, in administrative law, the principles of natural justice 
and procedural fairness offer parallel protection to litigants in contexts where 
constitutional and quasi-constitutional guarantees may not apply. The guarantee 
of an impartial decision maker is said to maintain public confidence in our public 
decision-making institutions. It therefore serves the wider public as much as it 
does the litigants.94 As in the judicial sphere, the test for reasonable apprehen-
variety of administrative bodies and that the concept of reasonable apprehension of bias must 
therefore be flexible); Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, 1 SCR 190 (for the SCC’s 
most recent attempt to fully re-articulate the appropriate standards of review).
92. Imperial Oil Ltd v Québec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58 at para 28, 2 SCR 
624 [Imperial Oil].
93. Charter, supra note 25 at ss 7, 11(d).
94. See R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 KB 256; Valente v The Queen, [1985] 2 
SCR 673 at para 22, 52 OR (2d) 779 [Valente].
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sion of bias in administrative law centres on the perception of a right-minded 
and well-informed person who has thought the matter through.95 But, whereas 
judicial impartiality is determined by the strictest standards of the adversarial 
system,96 the test used to determine the impartiality of an administrative actor 
depends on the role the actor plays and the way it functions.97 Context, therefore, 
plays a central role in administrative law bias cases. 
The need for attention to context is largely due to the nature of the Canadian 
administrative state, which includes many types of decision-making bodies that 
straddle the executive and judiciary.98 The different types of administrative 
decision makers range from adversarial, court-like adjudicative bodies such as 
human rights tribunals and labour boards, to broad-based, polycentric decision 
and policy makers such as energy regulators and communications licensing 
boards.99 As a result of this spectrum, it has become standard practice for 
courts to take account of the way that a particular tribunal functions in order 
to determine if disqualifying bias has been shown during the decision-making 
process. The test for impartiality that is applied to administrative actors therefore 
exhibits flexibility, in comparison to its judicial counterpart, to account for the 
95. See the test as articulated in Committee for Justice and Liberty, supra note 82.
96. RDS, supra note 79 at para 93.
97. See, Matsqui, supra note 92; 2747-3174 Québec Inc v Québec (Régie des permis d’alcool), 
[1996] 3 SCR 919, 140 DLR (4th) 577 [Régie]; RDS, supra note 79 at para 32; Imperial 
Oil, supra note 93. The use of flexibility in determining issues of impartiality within 
administrative law is discussed in Laverne Jacobs, “Caught between Judicial Paradigms 
and the Administrative State’s Pastiche: ‘Tribunal’ Independence, Impartiality, and 
Bias” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context , 2 ed, 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2012) [Jacobs, “Caught between Judicial Paradigms 
and the Administrative State’s Pastiche”]; and Gus Van Harten et al, “Bias and Lack of 
Independence” in G Van Harten, G Heckman & D Mullan, eds, Administrative Law, Cases, 
Text and Materials, (Toronto, Emond Montgomery: 2010) [Van Harten, “Bias and Lack of 
Independence”]. The academic debate overt whether the independence and impartiality of 
administrative tribunals should more closely mirror the courts is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For discussion of that issue see Ron Ellis, Unjust by Design: Canada’s Administrative 
Justice System (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013).
98. For discussion of the ways in which administrative bodies straddle the judiciary and 
executive, please see Ocean Port Hotel Ltd v British Columbia, 2001 SCC 52, 2 SCR 
781[Ocean Port Hotel].
99. The nature of the Canadian administrative state and the varying structures of administrative 
bodies are discussed in Laverne Jacobs, “A Wavering Commitment?: Administrative 
Independence and Collaborative Governance in Ontario’s Adjudicative Tribunals 
Accountability Legislation” (2010) 28:2 Windsor YB Access Just 285. See also Bogart, supra 
note 74.
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administrative actor’s nature and functions. Nevertheless, there is room for more 
methodological rigour in the SCC’s current contextual approach. 
There are generally two conceptual paradigms within which questions about 
reasonable apprehension of bias arise in administrative law. The first relates to 
the independence of administrative actors and addresses, indirectly, the question 
of impartiality. Independence is said to be a threshold guarantee to assure that 
the decision maker has an appropriate state of mind. This paradigm will be 
elaborated in more detail below. The second conceptual paradigm encompasses 
questions about the state of mind of the administrative actor within the decision-
making process and, as such, concerns impartiality directly.100 With respect to 
both independence and impartiality, the theory of grounded administrative 
impartiality can result in a more rigorous and complete analysis of situations 
in which disqualifying bias has been alleged. The next section presents some 
examples by revisiting the analysis of key SCC cases.
1. ADMINISTRATIVE INDEPENDENCE
Arguments about reasonable apprehension of bias sometimes concentrate on 
whether an administrative actor’s structure or relationships appear sufficiently 
free of inappropriate interference. Administrative law theory upholds the idea 
that an administrative body will be empowered to decide all cases before it 
impartially if inappropriate interferences are limited. In this way, independence 
and impartiality are separate but related concepts, with independence acting as a 
guarantee or a threshold to ensure impartiality.101 
100. These situations arise when the decision maker may reasonably be perceived to have: (1) 
a pecuniary or material interest in the outcome of the matter being decided; (2) personal 
relationships with those involved in the dispute; (3) prior knowledge or information about 
the matter in dispute; or (4) an attitudinal predisposition towards an outcome. The first three 
situations are forms of conflict of interest. See generally, Jacobs, “Caught between Judicial 
Paradigms and the Administrative State’s Pastiche,” supra note 97 at 258.
101. See e.g. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in her separate concurring reasons in Régie, supra note 97. 
On judicial review, Canadian courts often evaluate whether an administrative tribunal is 
sufficiently independent by analyzing the factors that have been determined to affect the 
independence of courts and members of the judiciary. These factors are security of tenure, 
financial security, administrative control, and adjudicative independence. The first three are 
often termed “objective conditions” of independence because they concern the structural 
relationship that has been put in place between the decision maker or decision-making 
institution and the government with which it maintains an arm’s length relationship of 
accountability. The fourth, adjudicative independence, relates to institutional practices, 
organization, and relationships within the administrative body, as well as the ways in which 
they may affect a decision-maker’s ability to reason fairly. Reference to these factors is used 
to gauge whether a reasonable, well-informed person would perceive that an administrative 
body or its individual members have sufficient independence to fulfill their decision-
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At the same time, the Court’s method of analysis for determining if there is 
a lack of independence giving rise to reasonable apprehension of bias is, unfortu-
nately, underdeveloped and has led to conflicting results in the jurisprudence.102 
The main difficulty is that the test for lack of independence, which is the same 
test used to determine if there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, as it currently 
stands, offers little guidance to a reasonable observer in deciding whether there 
is a lack of independence that merits concern. There is a discernible absence of 
direction for determining the contextual information that should be examined 
when questions of independence arise. In the next section, the Court’s analyses in 
Matsqui and Ocean Port Hotel are contrasted to illustrate the SCC’s ambivalence to 
context in determining administrative independence cases. Bell is then discussed 
to show how the factors of a grounded approach can assist in this regard.
I. SCRUTINIZING OPERATIONAL CONTEXT—MATSQUI, OCEAN PORT HOTEL
The SCC has vacillated on the issue of how closely, if at all, reviewing courts 
should look at the operational context or daily workings of an administrative 
body when determining if there is a lack of independence causing a reasonable 
apprehension of bias. In large part, this inconsistency occurs because the Court 
has failed to ground its consideration of contextual data in specific questions 
that it seeks to answer about reasonable apprehension of bias. Two of the most 
significant SCC cases on structural independence—namely, Matsqui and Ocean 
Port Hotel—illustrate this point well. 
In 2001, the administrative independence jurisprudence underwent 
a significant development when the SCC held in Ocean Port Hotel that clear 
legislative language indicating the degree of independence of an administrative 
actor should take precedence over common law principles of natural justice. 
making mandates with impartiality. For example, a court might inquire into the ability of 
government to arbitrarily change the administrative actor’s length of appointment, pay, or 
the cases that an adjudicator may hear. However, administrative bodies are not expected to 
meet the same standard of independence as courts. The SCC has held that it is necessary 
to allow some flexibility for the various ways that tribunals function. See e.g. Valente, supra 
note 94; Matsqui, supra note 91; and Jacobs, “Caught between Judicial Paradigms and the 
Administrative State’s Pastiche,” supra note 97.
102. I discuss the divergent outcomes with respect to operational context in Matsqui and 
Ocean Port as well as the conflicting approaches to adjudicative independence in Bell and 
Consolidated Bathurst in Laverne A Jacobs, “Tribunal Independence and Impartiality: 
Rethinking the Theory After Bell and Ocean Port Hotel—A Call for Empirical Analysis” in 
Laverne A Jacobs & Justice Anne L Mactavish, Dialogue Between Courts and Tribunals: Essays 
in Administrative Law and Justice 2001-2007 (Montreal: Les Éditions Thémis, 2008) at 43.
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The Court left unsettled, however, the question of how to determine whether 
independence was compromised (and, if so, how to rectify it) when the relevant 
legislation was ambiguous. In this regard, the earlier SCC case of Matsqui is 
useful for illustrating the value of referring to a tribunal’s operational context in 
determining if a reasonable apprehension of bias exists due to lack of indepen-
dence. This section first contrasts the minority and majority opinions on the issue 
of independence in Matsqui, showing that the majority’s analysis reflects many 
elements of the theory of grounded administrative impartiality. It next outlines 
some of the advantages brought to bear by scrutinizing operational context, 
particularly through the contextual factors of the theory.
In Matsqui, issues of independence and impartiality arose with respect to 
certain First Nations tax assessment boards that were not yet in operation but 
whose enabling legislation had been enacted when the litigation began. The 
Court stressed the value of seeing a tribunal in operation before determining if 
its decision-making process gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias due 
to insufficient independence. The majority decision on the issue of indepen-
dence exemplifies the high water mark of the contextual approach to assessing 
independence in administrative law.103 There was significant divergence, however, 
between the minority and majority with respect to how to analyze the issue 
of independence. 
Writing in the minority on the issue of independence, Chief Justice Lamer 
argued that the nature of the tribunal, the interests at stake, and “other indices of 
independence” are to be taken into consideration in assessing whether an adminis-
trative body possesses sufficient independence to avoid raising a reasonable 
apprehension of bias. The Chief Justice dealt with the last two of these factors—
namely, the interests at stake and “other indices of independence”— quickly. 
103. Four justices (Justices L’Heureux-Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, and Iacobucci) were of the view 
that the issue of independence could not be determined until the tribunal could be assessed 
in operation. These four formed the majority on the issue of independence, though they 
ended up in dissent on the main issue of whether the matter should be sent back to the 
First Nations tax assessment boards. Two (Lamer Chief Justice and Justice Cory) held that 
the tribunal exhibited a lack of independence, which gave rise to a reasonable apprehension 
of bias. They therefore concluded that that the tribunals did not represent an adequate 
alternative remedy for CP Rail and Unitel to exhaust before applying for judicial review. 
Justices LaForest, McLachlin, and Major were also of the opinion that the tribunals were not 
an adequate alternate remedy. However, they focused their discussion on the lack jurisdiction 
of the tribunal and did not address the independence issue at all. In summary, six of the 
nine addressed the issue of independence and, of the six justices in majority, four were of the 
view that operational context was important to observe prior to forming an opinion. It is for 
this reason that these four justices are considered to hold the majority’s view on the issue of 
independence. See e.g. Matsqui, supra note 91. 
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As for the interests at stake, he noted that tax appeals were important but could 
not be considered among the most significant interests held by an individual 
(unlike security of the person, for example). Something less than the highest 
level of independence would therefore be appropriate. As for the “other indices 
of independence,” the only one he noted, without explanation, was the oath of 
office that the members were to swear, affirming that they would act impartially.
Chief Justice Lamer devoted more attention to the nature of the tribunal. In 
determining the nature of the tribunal, he looked specifically at the tax assessment 
boards’ primary and secondary enabling legislation. His analysis focused on the 
statutory language outlining how appointments were to be made to the tribunals 
and describing the tribunals’ powers. His greatest concern was that the enabling 
bylaws did not guarantee remuneration or fixed terms of appointment.104 At most, 
the permissive language of the legislation indicated that members of the tribunal 
“may” be paid reasonable remuneration.105 Moreover, there was no guarantee 
of security of tenure. In Justice Lamer’s opinion, the bylaws ambiguously left 
decisions regarding the length of appointment terms to the chief and council 
of each First Nations group.106 The Chief Justice would have preferred to have 
seen provisions outlining fixed terms of appointments within the language of 
the enabling statute.107 Finally, there was a concern that since the chiefs and 
councils of the bands that were to appoint the board members would also appear 
regularly before the tribunals, a party could face a tribunal appointed and paid 
by members of the opposing party. The Chief Justice found the entire structure 
to be inadequate for an adjudicative body performing court-like functions. He 
therefore concluded that the possibility of arbitrariness in pay and dismissal 
was evident and held that a reasonable person would have an apprehension of 
bias due to the insufficient legislative guarantees of independence. As he put it, 
“[i]ndependence premised on discretion is illusory.”108
By contrast, the majority of the justices who addressed the issue of indepen-
dence in Matsqui held that the issue could not be determined until one had an 
opportunity to see the tax assessment tribunals up and running. Writing for the 
majority on this issue, Justice Sopinka noted that it is not safe to form conclusions 
based on the wording of the legislation alone, as knowledge of the operational 
104. For the relevant bylaw provisions, see Matsqui, supra note 91 at paras 88-91.
105. Although they would be paid for travelling and out of pocket expenses incurred in the course 
of their duties. Ibid at para 90.
106. Ibid at para 98.
107. Ibid at paras 99-100.
108. Ibid at para 104.
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reality may provide “a significantly richer context for objective consideration of 
the institution and its relationships.”109 Otherwise, he stated, referring to the 
fact that the test for independence is based on the impression of a reasonable, 
well-informed person, “the administrative law hypothetical ‘right-minded person’ 
is right minded, but uninformed”110 and that conclusions about independence 
are generally not formed until after a tribunal is in operation.111 Finally, Justice 
Sopinka was particularly interested in preserving both aboriginal rights and the 
policy of self-government that had been initiated through the First Nations 
tax assessment tribunals. He found that the principle that statutes relating to 
aboriginal rights should be construed liberally, with doubtful expressions resolved 
in favour of their preservation, applied equally in the context of evaluating the 
institutional independence of the tax assessment boards. It was within this larger 
context that the majority of judges who addressed the issue found it inappropriate 
to form conclusions about the aboriginal tax assessment boards’ independence 
without first having the benefit of seeing how they would operate. These judges 
therefore took the notion of context beyond what was available in the statutory 
language to incorporate broader contextual elements about the reason for the 
tribunal’s creation, the importance of preserving aboriginal tax rights that already 
existed in the case law, the social policy goals it aimed to fulfill, and how discretion 
would be employed once it was up and running. 
In Matsqui, the majority opinion on the issue of institutional independence 
consisted of a discussion of administrative actor provenance and institutional 
practices, the first two of the five factors of the theory of grounded impartiality. 
The majority decision on this issue illustrates how these two factors may be 
useful in analyzing the question of reasonable apprehension of bias. The majority 
did not discuss the other factors related to a theory of grounded impartiality. If 
109. Ibid at para 123. 
110. Ibid at para 123. Justice Sopinka held: 
That institutional independence must be considered “objectively” does not preclude 
considering the operation of a legislative scheme which creates an administrative tribunal, 
but only vaguely or partly sets out the three Valente elements, as in this appeal, where the 
taxation by-laws in issue are silent with regard to details relating to tenure and remuneration. 
It is not safe to form final conclusions as to the workings of this institution on the wording 
of the by-laws alone. Knowledge of the operational reality of these missing elements may very 
well provide a significantly richer context for objective consideration of the institution and its 
relationships. Otherwise, the administrative law hypothetical “right-minded person” is right 
minded, but uninformed.
111. The cases that the majority referred to as support were: Alex Couture Inc v Canada (Attorney-
General) (1991), 83 DLR (4th) 577, 41 QAC 1, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1992] 2 
SCR v; MacBain v Lederman, [1985] 1 FC 856, 22 DLR (4th) 119 (CA); Mohammad v 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 FC 363, 21 FTR 240 (CA).
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pushed further, however, it would appear that the analysis could also usefully 
address the question of discourse and, specifically, whether meaningful dialogue 
between the assessment board members and non-band litigants could actually 
take place once the tribunals were up and running. 
There are valid reasons for incorporating aspects of operational context into 
the determination of independence. A consideration of contextual factors—such 
as the origins and purpose of the administrative actor, any family likenesses, the 
institutional culture, institutional practices, shared understandings between the 
administrative actor and the industry, connections between decision makers and 
litigants, and the possibility for meaningful discourse during proceedings—can 
yield a fuller picture of whether barriers to fair and meaningful decision making 
are present. They ground the analysis of reasonable apprehension of bias by 
focusing the inquiry on concrete areas where barriers to independence may exist.
 Moreover, the nature of the reasonable apprehension of bias test, and 
its emphasis on the perception of a reasonable person, itself speaks to why a 
grounded analysis is preferable. The test should enable this reasonable observer 
to provide balanced opinions—that is, to be neither hasty nor otiose in reaching 
conclusions about the existence of disqualifying bias in administrative action given 
the interests at stake. On the one hand, the analysis of reasonable apprehension 
of bias should avoid hurried, uninformed, and therefore unmerited disruptions 
of the administrative state, though there are certainly instances where criticism 
and disruption of administrative actors are necessary. A decision that is not fully 
informed risks working against the legitimate policy goals of the administrative 
actor, which, as was the case in Matsqui, may have been developed collaboratively 
to further a social policy in the public interest. Alternatively, it may be that an 
administrative body has gone to great lengths to use its discretion to protect 
decision-making independence and procedural fairness in its proceedings in light 
of statutory shortcomings. These administrative actions may be unnecessarily 
defeated by an uninformed decision about disqualifying bias. 
At the same time, in reaching a conclusion about disqualifying bias, the 
reasonable person must take the interests at stake into account in deciding how 
far to go in searching for justifications. Considering operational context in light 
of ambiguous statutory language may be justifiable in circumstances related to 
tax appeals. However, in the context of individual liberty—for example, with 
respect to detention of individuals alleged to be a threat to national security, 
where the information shared about the individual’s case is limited and risks to 
individual liberty are high—the reasonable person would understandably be 
less amenable to wait for an administrative procedure to be put into operation 
JACOBS, FROM RAWLS TO HABERMAS 581
in order to analyze any possible discretionary contextual safeguards.112 When 
there are risks to individual liberty and security of the person, statutory analysis 
alone may be sufficient to trigger concerns about independence, and, therefore, 
procedural fairness, in the administrative state.
 Reading the statute alone to determine independence, as the minority in 
Matsqui chose to do, is in keeping with a liberal view. Rawlsian impartiality 
requires disengagement from the realities of everyday life. But determining 
administrative independence solely by way of statutory analysis does not 
accord weight to the various practices, norms, and self-understandings that 
may present barriers or render a perception of bias caused by lack of statutory 
independence more or less reasonable.113 What is needed is an analysis derived 
from the open-ended question of whether any barriers exist that would hinder 
the decision maker from adjudicating fairly. The approach of the minority in 
Matsqui, therefore, unfortunately suggests shutting the door to the much 
richer set of information brought by the exploration of operational context. 
Moreover, as emphasized by feminist theorists, grounding decision making 
in concrete realities as opposed to abstract ideals allows for more authentic 
generalization. In a field as pluralistic as the Canadian administrative state, 
an appreciation of operational realities would allow for a more faithful 
incorporation of general principles of administrative independence.114 Justice 
112. For an example of this, see the US Supreme Court (US Court) case of Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 
Secretary of Defense et al, 548 US 557. Although this case did not concern the issue of 
independence, it dealt with the safeguards of procedural fairness required for an individual 
detainee tried by military commission. Specifically, the US Court concluded that it could 
condemn such commissions for lack of procedural fairness, even before trial, so long as the 
relevant legislative material provides a basis to presume that a hearing meeting basic tenets of 
fairness would not be held.
113. While there are certainly approaches to statutory interpretation that are contextual in 
nature within Canadian public law jurisprudence, these approaches focus on understanding 
statutory provisions within the broader statutory language and its historical purpose(s). 
See e.g. Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Montréal 
(City); Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Boisbriand 
(City), 2000 SCC 27, [2000] 1 SCR 665. What distinguishes the grounded approach to 
impartiality is that the contextual elements examined do not only include an appreciation of 
the greater statutory scheme but, more importantly, it aims to take into account aspects of 
the day-to-day operational realities of the administrative body in question.
114. Two ways in which a tribunal’s practices, norms, and self-understandings can be brought 
before the court on judicial review are through an examination of documents produced by 
the tribunal (e.g., annual reports) and by allowing the tribunal to appear before the court to 
discuss them. Both offer a much richer dialogue with the tribunal than a simple reading of 
the statute. One is reminded of Habermas’s discourse theory employed in a context where 
the interlocutors are the courts and the tribunal under review. However, the courts have been 
wary to adopt methods of review that foster such a dialogue. While documents emanating 
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Sopinka’s insistence on seeing the tribunal in operation comports with this 
view.
To summarize, in cases where legislative language pertaining to the indepen-
dence of administrative actors is ambiguous, the SCC has sent unclear messages 
about whether an administrative body’s operational context should be examined 
and, if so, which elements should be scrutinized. These unclear messages are 
the inevitable result of an approach that is not firmly rooted in a principled 
search for contextualized diagnostic data. Moreover, although the majority of the 
judges who addressed the independence issue in Matsqui articulated an approach 
that favours looking at the tribunal in operation, this could be further refined 
to ensure the use of specific factors to guide the analysis. Adopting a grounded 
approach will empower the hypothetical reasonable person to reach conclusions 
about the sufficiency of independence that are neither uninformed and hasty, nor 
overly tolerant.  
II. APPLYING A GROUNDED APPROACH IN THE GAP OF STATUTORY 
AMBIGUITY: BELL
This section focuses on how the theory of grounded impartiality would prompt 
a different set of analytical considerations in a case concerning the sufficiency of 
independence under a statutory provision that gives a public official discretion 
with respect to an administrative decision-maker’s security of tenure. In Bell 
Canada v Canadian Telephone Employees Association,115 a case decided shortly after 
Ocean Port Hotel, Bell Canada argued that the independence of the Canadian 
Human Rights Tribunal (the Tribunal) had been compromised by the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission’s power to issue guidelines binding on the Tribunal 
in relation to classes of cases, and by the power of the Tribunal Chair to extend 
from the tribunal are usually accepted, the Court has opened the door only tentatively to 
allowing tribunals to appear on judicial review of their own decisions to discuss their policies 
and practices. The seminal case on the issue is Northwestern Utilities Ltd v City of Edmonton, 
[1979] 1 SCR 684, 89 DLR (3d) 161. For another case dealing with this issue, see Ontario, 
(Children’s Lawyer) v Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) 75 OR (3d) 309, 253 
DLR (4th) 489 (CA). For literature on granting tribunals standing on judicial review of their 
own proceedings see: Laverne A Jacobs & Thomas S Kuttner, “Discovering What Tribunals 
Do: Tribunal Standing before the Courts” (2002) 81:3 Can Bar Rev 616. Noel Semple, 
“The Case for Tribunal Standing” (2007) 20:3 Can J Admin L & P 305; Frank AV Falzon, 
“Tribunal Standing on Judicial Review” (2008) 21:1 Can J Admin L & P 21.  
115. 2003 SCC 36, 1 SCR 884 [Bell].
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the terms of Tribunal members if they expired during an ongoing inquiry. Both 
powers were discretionary and found their source in the enabling legislation.116
The Court rejected both arguments. It was convinced neither that the 
Human Rights Commission’s guideline power posed a potential threat to 
independence,117 nor that the Chairperson’s discretionary power to extend the 
appointments of tribunal members compromised the members’ security of tenure 
and, therefore, independence.118 In finding no breach of the members’ security 
of tenure, the Court put forward two main justifications for the Chairperson’s 
discretionary power. Interestingly, neither justification simply followed Ocean 
Port by holding that the legislation was clear in requiring the Chair to take on 
this discretionary role. By contrast, it appears that this was a situation where the 
statute was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the Court stepping in to illuminate 
the precise standard of independence. The Court’s first justification was that the 
power did not infringe upon independence because it was a necessity: Someone 
had to be able to extend appointments when they expired before a hearing was 
complete.119 The Tribunal Chairperson was in a good position to take on this 
role in light of his or her knowledge of the situation and because of his or her 
separation from the Human Rights Commission, which would be a party to 
the litigation. The second justification was that the Court in Valente had already 
approved legislation endowing the head of a decision-making body with a discre-
tionary power to extend appointments.120 Beyond these two justifications, the 
Court also held that a high level of independence was required because of the 
adjudicative nature the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.121
116. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, ss 27(2), 27 (3), 48.2(2).
117. The SCC found that the guideline power did not infringe the independence of the Tribunal 
members because it was a legitimate form of law that had to be applied; there was nothing to 
indicate that the Tribunal would favour the Commission as a party before it simply because 
it had the power to create guidelines; and there was no evidence that the Commission had 
attempted to use the guidelines to influence the Tribunal in its favour. 
118. See e.g. ibid, s 48.2(2): 
(2) A member whose appointment expires may, with the approval of the Chairperson, conclude 
any inquiry that the member has begun, and a person performing duties under this subsection 
is deemed to be a part-time member for the purposes of sections 48.3, 48.6, 50 and 52 to 58.
119. See Bell, supra note 115 at para 52.
120. Ibid at para 53. See Valente, supra note 94.
121. The Court posited the now familiar idea of a spectrum, with some administrative tribunals 
closer to the executive with the aim of developing policy and others closer to the judicial 
end with the primary purpose of adjudicating disputes through a form of hearing. The latter 
set of tribunals are said to require a higher degree of independence. The Court also noted 
that the tribunal may have a number of different functions and that all functions are to be 
considered in determining the degree of independence.
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Yet, none of these justifications engages directly with the issue of whether 
a decision maker, whose term was precariously waiting for renewal, could 
reasonably be perceived not to be deciding independently. Use of the factors 
suggested by the grounded theoretical approach would have prompted the Court 
to inquire about a different set of elements in the administrative actor’s surround-
ings that might, in perception or in reality, have prevented it from deciding 
freely. The factors suggested by the grounded theory concern the administra-
tive actor’s provenance—that is, the statutory and policy reasons for creating the 
tribunal and whether they are being implemented appropriately in the institu-
tion’s work; institutional self-understandings, culture and practices that have 
developed within the tribunal organically as it has taken on its own existence 
over time and which may fall in the way of adjudication according to one’s 
conscience; and a consideration of the local understandings among the adminis-
trative actor and other members of its immediate external community, such as 
executive branch ministers, industry, and the public, for an understanding of 
the impact on decision making that these local understandings have. Lastly, the 
factors of connection and discourse may also be relevant for the issue of whether 
the guidelines prevented the parties from participating as fully as they should 
in the decision-making process. Each of these factors will likely exist to some 
extent for every administrative actor, and the presence or absence of any one 
of these factors does not automatically indicate that independence is hindered. 
Rather, each factor should be examined for what it reveals about decision-making 
independence in the context of the administrative actor in question and in light 
of the factual circumstances that have given rise to the allegation.
Applying a grounded theoretical approach, the Court in Bell might first have 
reflected on the policy goals behind the creation of the Human Rights Tribunal 
and asked whether the attainment of these goals would legitimate the discretion 
vested with the Chair to extend appointments.122 In its analysis, the Court could 
have considered evidence regarding the history of the Tribunal, including its 
122. The Tribunal Chairperson’s power to extend appointments originated in the enabling statute 
of the Tribunal, which prevented its decisions from being overturned by common law 
principles of fairness, including independence. Instead of relying on this grant of authority 
by the enabling statute, a principle reiterated in Ocean Port Hotel, the Court duly explored 
Bell’s argument, providing the two responses that I have outlined. In light of Valente, the 
Court concluded that: 
[i]f the discretionary power of the Chief Justice and Judicial Council of the provincial courts 
to extend the tenure of judges does not compromise their independence in a manner that 
contravenes the requirements of judicial independence, then neither does the discretionary 
power of the Tribunal Chairperson compromise the independence of Tribunal members in a 
manner that contravenes common law procedural fairness.
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place, alongside the Human Rights Commission, in the statutory network aimed 
at resolving human rights claims as expeditiously as possible. 
Continuing with this grounded inquiry, the Court might then have 
assessed whether the extension power posed a perceived or real barrier to fair 
and independent adjudication on fact and law. To do so, the Court could have 
explored a series of questions about the shared understandings that exist within 
the human rights tribunal. These questions would necessarily be tethered to the 
arguments put forward by the party alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias 
due to insufficient independence, and could vary from case to case. But, as an 
example, if the concern were that the Chair might withhold the extension of 
a member’s expiring appointment because of disagreement with the decision 
the member planned to render in the pending case, evidence showing statistical 
patterns regarding renewal might be useful. Any available information (for 
instance, mission statements, annual reports, academic or other studies done 
on the tribunal or its members) might also be helpful in identifying the norms 
and values underlying the tribunal’s culture and whether the Chair’s discretion is 
auspicious against this backdrop. The internal practices of the Tribunal that stem 
from this institutional culture could also be accessed in this way. Although it 
might be challenging to pierce and draw conclusions from the internal norms of 
a group of co-workers within an organization like an administrative tribunal and 
their connections to those that regulate them, a grounded theory would at least 
open the door to considering in a systematic fashion internal culture, practices, 
and self-understandings as possible barriers to independence. Local understand-
ings could have a role to play as well, if only to document what legitimate 
expectations (if any) a litigant might have in this instance. Finally, since this 
particular institutional issue did not involve a specific hearing  involving the 
litigants’ rights, it is unlikely that connection and discourse would have been 
particularly probing factors in this case.
In sum, while we do not have enough evidence to determine if Bell Canada 
would have been decided differently under a grounded theory approach, it is 
clear that such an analysis would have been more transparent and centred on 
identifiable guideposts of operational context.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPARTIALITY 
The test of whether a reasonable person with full information who has thought 
the matter through would apprehend bias is equally dissatisfying as a test for 
lack of impartiality as it is for lack of independence. As with the Court’s doctrine 
 Bell, supra note 115 at para 53. 
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on administrative independence, the administrative impartiality jurisprudence 
is founded on a methodology that requires more robust development. Cases in 
which conflicts of interest are alleged illustrate some of the main difficulties in 
applying the test and offer an opportunity to consider how a grounded approach 
to impartiality could provide a different perspective.
I. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST—IMPERIAL OIL, RÉGIE
Conflicts of interest relate to perceptions that arise from the actions or relation-
ships of a decision maker and may be present on an individual or institutional 
level. Disqualifying bias resulting from a conflict of interest can occur in 
situations where a pecuniary or other material interest of a decision maker appears 
reasonably to have jeopardized a fair hearing in a matter, or when personal or 
professional relationships between the administrative actor and parties, counsel, 
or witnesses compromise the perception that an unbiased process has been or will 
be followed.123 
When alleged conflicts arise on an individual or institutional level there 
are three main issues: (1) how direct and immediate the apparent conflict or 
conflicting relationship is; (2) the existence of any legislative sanction; and (3) the 
nature of the functions performed by the administrative actor and, in particular, 
how closely they mirror those of a court. Because the notion of impartiality relates 
fundamentally to how well litigants and decision makers can engage in open 
and meaningful dialogue within the decision-making context, one would assume 
that an assessment of how direct and immediate the conflict is would occupy a 
primary role in the evaluation. However, the SCC and lower courts have shown 
a tendency to focus more closely on legislative exemptions that may allow the 
conflict to stand as well as the nature of the functions performed by the adminis-
trative actor.124 This problematic approach has left a vacuum in the Canadian 
administrative law doctrine of impartiality because of its lack of engagement with 
123. On the legal doctrine of disqualifying bias in Canadian administrative law, see generally 
Van Harten, “Bias and Lack of Independence”; Jacobs, “Caught between Judicial Paradigms 
and the Administrative State’s Pastiche”; David P Jones & Anne de Villars, Principles of 
Administrative Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2009).
124. See e.g. Brosseau v Alberta Securities Commission, [1989] 1 SCR 301, 57 DLR (4th) 458 
[Brosseau]; Imperial Oil, supra note 92; Global Securities Corp v British Columbia Securities 
Commission (1998), 56 BCLR (3d) 237, 162 DLR (4th) 601 (CA) [Global Securities cited to 
BCLR]; Lambert v College of Physicians and Surgeons (1992), 101 Sask R 81, 31 ACWS (3d) 
1296 [Lambert]; Broers v Real Estate Council of Alberta, 2010 ABQB 497, [2010] AWLD 
4787 [Broers]; Anne & Gilbert Inc v Prince Edward Island (Minister of Finance and Municipal 
Affairs), 2011 PESC 15, 311 Nfld & PEIR 264 [Anne & Gilbert].
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the central issues that would preoccupy a reasonable observer concerned about 
the decision-maker’s state of mind. These central issues include the possibility of 
genuine discourse throughout the proceeding and any connections between the 
decision maker and others that may foil this discourse. A grounded approach to 
impartiality could, on the other hand, offer a more piercing analysis than what is 
presently found in the jurisprudence. 
For example, consider the administrative law doctrine that a reasonable 
apprehension of bias is deemed not to arise as long as the conflicting functions of 
an administrative body are prescribed by constitutionally valid enabling legisla-
tion.125 Under the rule of law, democratically created legislation may authorize a 
single administrative body to perform functions such as prosecution and adjudi-
cation even though the performance of both functions by the same entity would 
otherwise contradict the principles of natural justice. The difficulty with the 
doctrine is that it has been interpreted in some instances to permit conflicting 
functions to survive without scrutiny even in cases where the legislation has 
not expressly sanctioned the specific type of conflict at issue. In other words, it 
fails to deal with the discretionary pockets that may exist within the legislation 
where the conflicting actions are not entirely covered by the legislation’s sanction. 
Imperial Oil offers an example of this conundrum and enables us to explore how a 
qualitative assessment of the existence of impartiality using a grounded approach 
can be useful in assessing whether a reasonable apprehension of bias exists in such 
circumstances.  
In Imperial Oil, environmental contamination was found in the soil of a 
housing development formerly owned and operated by Imperial Oil for several 
decades as a petroleum products depot. In 1998, the Québec Minister of the 
Environment (the Minister) issued a characterization order against Imperial Oil. 
The order, which followed the polluter-pays principle, required Imperial Oil to 
produce and submit, at its own expense, a site characterization study ascertaining 
the nature of the contamination and outlining appropriate decontamination 
measures. Under the same statutory provision, the entity responsible for the 
contamination could also be held responsible for the costs and execution of the 
125. This doctrine is most clearly articulated by the SCC in Brosseau, supra note 125. For cases 
that have discussed or have applied the doctrine, see: Imperial Oil, supra note 92; Global 
Securities, supra note 125; Lambert, supra note 125; Broers, supra note 125; Anne & Gilbert, 
ibid. For SCC cases dealing with the issue of seemingly conflicting interests but in the very 
politicized context of elected municipal councilors, see e.g. Old St Boniface Residents Assn 
Inc v Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 SCR 1170, [1991] 2 WWR 145; Save Richmond Farmland 
Society v Richmond (Township), [1990] 3 SCR 1213, 52 BCLR (2d) 145.
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decontamination work. In issuing the order, the Minister acted under broad 
powers bestowed upon him by the Environment Quality Act.126
Imperial Oil challenged the order on grounds of procedural fairness, alleging 
that the Minister was in a conflict of interest and that the conflict should 
invalidate the order. The Ministry of the Environment (the Ministry) had, in 
fact, supervised decontamination of the site in the 1980s and had approved 
the decontamination methods used so that the housing development could be 
built. The Ministry approved the decontamination despite the fact that its own 
precondition requiring the involvement of an independent consultant had not 
been met. When the pollution problem resurfaced in the 1990s after the housing 
development had been built, owners of contaminated lots filed three court 
actions against the Minister, among others, alleging negligence in supervising 
and approving the decontamination work. Imperial Oil argued that a conflict of 
interest existed because the Minister had ordered it to undertake the characteriza-
tion study in the wake of these three pending court actions and with knowledge 
that additional court actions were forthcoming. The Minister, therefore, appeared 
to have a financial interest in reducing the costs that the Ministry would incur as 
a result of these lawsuits.
The SCC and all the courts and tribunals below (except the Québec Superior 
Court) dismissed the concerns about impartiality primarily through an analysis 
of the Minister’s multiple roles under the enabling statute. The Tribunal Adminis-
tratif du Québec (TAQ), for example, found that impartiality concerns were 
not engaged because the Minister was invested with overlapping and inherently 
conflicting functions by the enabling legislation. Specifically, the Minister was 
given the powers of providing information, participating in preservation and 
decontamination work, overseeing the application of the statute, issuing authori-
zations and permits, and making various categories of orders prescribing corrective 
measures.127 In a similar vein, the SCC held that the duty of impartiality does 
not apply to a Minister exercising what is essentially a discretionary and political 
power. The Court acknowledged the Minister’s broad discretion under the statute, 
his multiple functions, and the essentially political nature of this decision, which 
it viewed as a choice among three possible broad routes that could be taken 
to resolve the issue. The Minister had three statutorily authorized options in 
this case: (1) not to act at all; (2) to order the removal of the contaminants 
and attempt later to recover the costs; or (3) to pursue those responsible under 
126. RSQ, c Q-2.
127. See Cie pétroliere Impériale Ltée c Québec (Ministre de l’Environnement), [1999] TAQ 1256 at 
paras 82-85.
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the polluter-pays provision, as he chose to do. The Court focused exclusively on 
the Minister’s choice of options under the statute, indicating that the choice to 
pursue the polluter-pays principle was not, in and of itself, indicative of partiality. 
The analysis performed by both TAQ and the SCC to determine whether there 
was any appearance of partiality on the Minister’s part, therefore, rested at a 
macro level of scrutiny. 
Indeed, beyond discussing the decision to pursue the polluter-pays principle, 
the Court barely touched on the question of whether the process for determining 
if Imperial Oil should be ordered to perform a characterization study had been 
executed with an appropriate level of impartiality. The Court noted that there 
were procedural protections in place in the statute, but nowhere in the decision 
did it examine closely how the Minister executed these procedural protections. 
The Environmental Quality Act and The Act Respecting Administrative Justice 
allowed any entity that may be subject to a characterization order to present 
observations on the fairness of the order to the Minister.128 These observations 
were to be contemplated before the order was made. The Environmental Quality 
Act also required the Minister to provide reasons for a characterization order. 
There was no qualitative inquiry into the manner in which these obligations 
were fulfilled and, in particular, whether any improper purpose could reasonably 
be perceived in their execution. Given that the Minister was involved in live 
litigation at the time over his role in the decontamination of the very site in 
question, it is particularly surprising that the Court did not examine his receipt 
and contemplation of the observations presented by Imperial Oil or the reasons 
he supplied for ordering the characterization study.129 It is equally surprising that 
the Court did not explore functional necessity. More specifically, the Court did 
not examine the extent to which it could be said that any financial advantage 
that might occur as a result of the issuance of the characterization order was 
not attributable to the Minister’s design but merely to the fact that the enabling 
statute required him both to be involved in decontamination work and pursue 
the polluter-pays principle in appropriate circumstances. Even more importantly, 
it would have been useful to explore whether the reasons given for the order 
indicated that the Minister might have been catering to self-interest and financial 
savings. It would also have been useful to examine whether, by contrast, the 
128. See the Environmental Quality Act, supra note 127, s 31.44. See also The Act Respecting 
Administrative Justice, RSQ c J-3, s 5. For a discussion of the procedural requirements, see 
Imperial Oil, supra note 92.
129. Under the Environmental Quality Act, the Minister is required to provide reasons for issuing a 
characterization order. Supra note 127, s 31.42.
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Minister’s reasons focused on proper considerations within the statutory context, 
including whether the process followed allowed Imperial Oil to make its case 
adequately and fully and whether the Minister appropriately and fully considered 
the case before making the order. Instead, the Court found perfunctorily that 
the statutory requirements with respect to the proceedings had been met. As the 
Court stated:
The record confirms that the necessary notices were given. The appellant had an 
opportunity to present its observations, which the Minister reviewed before issuing 
a decision, for which reasons were given. The procedural framework established by 
the Act was therefore followed.130 
Imperial Oil demonstrates that once an administrative actor with potentially 
conflicting, but statutorily authorized, roles has decided to perform one of those 
roles, the question of whether it meets the standard of impartiality in executing 
that role is not always well examined.
Even more disappointing is the fact that the standard of impartiality for 
an administrative body performing one of its multiple conflicting roles is rarely 
articulated fully.131 In Imperial Oil, the Court stated that the content of the duty 
of impartiality “like that of all of the rules of procedural fairness, may vary in 
order to reflect the context of the decision-maker’s activities and the nature of its 
functions.”132 Yet, at no point does the Court identify what impartiality should 
look like for a Minister within the fact scenario of the case. All that is given is 
a reference to the procedural protections in place pursuant to the statute,133 but 
no guarantee that these protections contemplated the particular fact scenario at 
hand. 
130. Imperial Oil, supra note 92 at para 27.
131. Ibid. See also Newfoundland Telephone v Newfoundland, (Public Utilities Board), [1992] 1 
SCR 623, 89 DLR (4th) 289 [Newfoundland Telephone].
132. Imperial Oil, supra note 92 at para 31.
133. Writing for the Court, Lebel J, in dicta, calls simultaneously for context while showing 
a clear aversion to the task of contextually establishing the nature of impartiality, instead 
deferring to statutory language: 
Given these circumstances, we need a concrete definition of the nature and extent of the 
rules of procedural fairness that apply to the Minister’s decision. Is the Minister bound by a 
duty of impartiality, in its full scope and rigour, as are judges or administrative tribunals that 
essentially perform adjudicative functions, such as the ATQ or grievance arbitrators in the case 
of labour law? On this point, the decisions of this Court stress the crucial importance of a 
careful examination of the applicable legislation in order to determine the nature and scope of 
the rules of procedural fairness that apply to action taken by an administrative decision maker.
 Ibid at para 32. 
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A theory of grounded impartiality would have inquired into factors relevant 
to the Minister’s ability to engage fairly and openly in the decision-making process 
and whether he had so engaged in the prescribed process. By focusing on the 
concepts of discourse and connection, this approach would ascertain the extent 
to which there is room for genuine dialogue between the decision maker and 
litigants. A genuine dialogue is one in which the parties are heard by a decision 
maker whose mind is open to persuasion. Any considerations undermining 
the Minister’s ability to engage in appropriate discussions would, therefore, be 
brought forward for further examination. In this light, more attention might have 
been given to the report by the Ministry engineer indicating the Ministry’s desire 
to offset the legal costs occasioned by the lawsuit.134 The notion of connection 
can also ground questions about impartiality in cases where relationships appear 
to give rise to conflicts of interest. Active relationships, like those arising in live 
litigation, might reasonably cast a pall on the state of mind of the decision maker 
regardless of whether the administrative function is more political in nature. The 
degree to which any connections are sanctioned by valid enabling legislation 
must also be taken into account. 
Administrative actor provenance is clearly also fruitful in this scenario. The 
nature of the Minister’s political, discretionary, and other functions, as well as 
the extent to which his statutory obligations conflict, provide a backdrop for 
understanding the standard of impartiality that can reasonably be expected in 
fulfilling the statutory procedural protections. 
I would suggest that the Minister’s connection to Imperial Oil prior to 
litigation gave rise to a reasonable cause for concern about impartiality. Even 
within the broad framework of multiple and conflicting functions, the active 
litigation and the Minister’s prior connection to Imperial Oil raise reasonable 
concerns about the state of mind of the Minister in determining whether 
Imperial Oil should be ordered to perform a characterization study at its own 
expense. At this point, it may be that the question of necessity should arise and 
an exploration as to whether any other public official could perform the role of 
the Minister should have been explored. 
Ultimately, legislation alone cannot resolve allegations of conflict of interest. 
Rather, context beyond the statute is valuable in determining whether a reasonable 
apprehension of bias exists in such cases. Imperial Oil illustrates that there are 
additional elements within the operational context of administrative bodies, such 
as discourse, connection, and provenance, that are worthy of examination in 
134. See Cie pétrolière Impériale Ltée c Québec (Ministre de l’Environnement), JE 2000-442, REJB 
2000-17249.
(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL592
determining impartiality. A brief additional example can be used to show how 
the two remaining factors of the grounded analysis—namely, shared and local 
understandings—may play a role in determining whether impartiality has been 
met. In Régie des permis d’alcool (Régie),135 the SCC found that the possibility 
that lawyers and directors might perform the conflicting roles of prosecutor and 
adjudicator within Québec’s liquor licensing board raised a reasonable apprehen-
sion of bias at the institutional level that could not be countenanced by enabling 
legislation. The job descriptions had largely been left to the discretion of those 
managing the Régie, as the legislation did not define the roles of the lawyers and 
left open the possibility of the directors playing multiple and conflicting roles on 
the same file. Further, the Régie’s annual report showed that one individual could 
participate in the prosecution and adjudication of the same file.136
In the Régie fact scenario, beyond examining the provenance of the tribunal, 
its ability to engage in discourse, and any connections it may have with litigants, 
it would also have been useful to examine the shared understandings among 
those in the administrative agency about the agency’s role as well as the shared 
normative values guiding its design of procedural safeguards. A grounded analysis 
could serve to raise pertinent questions relating to why the conflicting roles 
may have been chosen and why they may or may not have been appropriate. 
Moreover, in determining fair and just outcomes, an administrative body may 
need to draw upon its knowledge of the community or industry it has been 
tasked with administering in order to interpret the relevant legislation. This 
expert knowledge may relate to technical subject matter, but it may also relate to 
documented expectations of what the community and the decision maker have 
considered to be fair in the past.
135. See Régie, supra note 97.
136. The Régie’s decision was quashed for lack of impartiality. See ibid at para 48. Even if the 
legislation had defined the conflicting roles, the decision still would have given rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of institutional bias at minimum, as the conflicting functions would 
have been found contrary the Québec Charter of Human Right and Freedoms. RSQ c C-12 
at s 23. The existence of constitutional (or, in this case, quasi-constitutional) restrictions is a 
point of distinction from cases such as Brosseau. Supra note 124. In that case, it was alleged 
that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias because the Chair of the Alberta Securities 
Commission had received the results of an investigation conducted by the Commission prior 
to conducting a hearing relating to the same company. Despite the conflicting investigatory 
and adjudicative roles, which permitted those in the Commission to essentially act as both 
prosecutor and judge, the Chair’s actions were not found to pose a threat to impartiality 
because they fit within the limits of a constitutionally valid enabling statute. On the notion of 
conflicting types of functions, see also Newfoundland Telephone, supra note 131. This was an 
administrative impartiality case dealing with attitudinal bias as opposed to conflict of interest.
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In addition to whatever authorization a statute may offer, focusing the 
impartiality analysis on the ideal of genuine dialogue, the connections between 
actors and litigants, the shared understandings within it, the provenance of 
the administrative agency, and the shared and local understandings within the 
community of decision maker and litigants, puts one in a better position to 
argue for or against a reasonable apprehension of bias. This information will not 
exonerate behaviour that clearly violates procedural fairness, but it opens the 
door to more transparent, robust, and complete determinations about allegations 
of bias.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, valuable insight can be gleaned from reading the Canadian 
administrative law jurisprudence on impartiality alongside political and moral 
theory. The evolution of the notion of impartiality in political and moral 
philosophy shows a move towards an embodied appreciation of justice. In 
Canadian public law, by contrast, a trend in this direction is less certain. When 
it comes to evaluating judges for their impartiality, courts have accepted the need 
to consider the judge under scrutiny as a contextualized being and to consider the 
social realities surrounding a factual situation. However, in determining whether 
a reasonable apprehension of bias has been shown with regard to administrative 
actors, courts have been ambivalent in their commitment to a contextual analysis 
and unclear in identifying what it should look like. 
In this article, I have presented the beginnings of a conceptual framework 
for addressing allegations of reasonable apprehension of bias in administrative 
law. This conceptual framework, which I have termed a theory of grounded 
impartiality, requires the consideration of specific contextual factors when 
administrative impartiality is under scrutiny. It also aims to create a dialogic 
space in which tribunals can explain their shared institutional understandings, 
cultures, and norms, as well as local understandings, before a reviewing court. 
The focus is on elaborating factors that aid the analysis of reasonable apprehen-
sion of bias. Identifying these factors pushes the analysis towards more concrete 
questions about the nature of the administrative actor and provides a richer 
understanding of why disqualifying bias should or should not be perceived. I 
argue that the factors of administrative actor provenance, institutional culture, 
shared understandings, local understandings, connection, and discourse can be 
relied upon to develop a more grounded, less inchoate articulation of why an 
apprehension of bias should or should not be considered reasonable. 
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Why should context matter? I suggest that at least two reasons can be put 
forward. The first deals with authenticity. As in political and moral philosophy, 
a contextualized analysis of impartiality in the administrative law sphere offers 
a more authentic understanding of what being impartial means. Schools of 
thought critical of Rawlsian liberalism expressed unease about the abstract and 
universal way in which principles of social justice were being developed. The 
same is true in administrative law. As opposed to using universal principles that 
can be discerned from largely abstract and theoretical legislation, the determi-
nation of whether impartiality exists should involve a true appreciation of the 
background and characteristics of the administrative bodies and litigants involved. 
However, a degree of caution and balance necessarily runs alongside this idea. 
Political theorists who fought for more concretized and embodied understand-
ings of impartiality were equally aware of the dangers of simply substituting the 
perspective of one group of individuals as the norm by which impartiality should 
be measured. In particular, feminist theorists fought for grounded understand-
ings of universality. Grounded understandings do not mean simply turning the 
focal point of so-called universal principles of justice from the hegemonic group 
to a group with a particular set of political aspirations.137 
This brings us to the second reason for contextualized judging. Translated 
to the context of impartiality in public law, contextualized approaches to 
impartiality serve to fulfill the aspirational goal of questioning from whose 
perspective impartiality can be said to be legitimate. Ultimately, one would 
hope that this questioning will bring about dialogue as different conceptions of 
impartial decision making are brought to the fore and are shared and justified. 
In the end, it may be that by considering factors such as provenance, shared 
and local understandings, connection, and discourse, new norms of impartiality 
will develop that are contextualized to fit more authentically with the decision-
making circumstances involved. This is especially true in administrative law, 
where the jurisprudence has maintained that context and flexibility are central. 
Embracing a move towards grounded impartiality in judicial review of adminis-
trative action will go far in providing decisions that are fair to individuals and 
that promote the public interest.
137. This was a theme grappled with by feminist scholars and other critical scholars. See e.g. 
Young, “Difference for Democratic Communication,” supra note 52.
